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FEMALE INVESTORS AND SECURITIES FRAUD: IS THE
REASONABLE INVESTOR A WOMAN?
JOAN MACLEOD HEMINWAY*

ABSTRACT
Let's face it. Women and men are different in more than just
the biological sense. These differences play themselves out in a
variety of contexts. Some of them are meaningful in theory or in
reality; others are not.
Given an increase in women's involvement in business and
finance, it is unsurprising that a multidisciplinary literature is
emerging at the intersection of sex or gender differences and corporate governance. Much of the work in this area has centered on
women and boards of directors and women in the executive ranks.
However, it is important to focus on women not only as corporate
directors and officers, but also as investors in firms. Among other
things, the identification and analysis of sex-based or gender-related
differences in investment behavior may help explain or predict market phenomena and may illuminate defects or gaps in regulatory
frameworks or provisions. For example, the investment attributes
of female investors may indicate that women are better or less well
protected from changes in firms, laws, or the market than their male
investor counterparts. Research along these lines is especially relevant at present in light of ongoing allegations of securities fraud and
significant volatility in securities markets.
With all of this in mind, this article extends scholarship that
questions the existing materiality standard used under Rule 10b-5
(and elsewhere in U.S. securities regulation) and its touchstone
notion of the reasonable investor. Specifically, the article asks and
answers a seemingly straightforward, yet provocative, question: Is the
reasonable investor a woman? The article then explores the potential
* Associate Professor, The University of Tennessee College of Law. New York
University School of Law, J.D. 1985; Brown University, A.B. 1982. I am exceptionally
grateful to colleagues who listened to presentations on earlier drafts of this article in the
following forums: The University of Tennessee Corporate Governance Center Research
Forum; Southeastern Association of Law Schools 2008 Annual Conference; and, of
course, the William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law 2008 Symposium, Not That
Kind of Girl: The Legal Treatment of Women Defying TraditionalGender Roles. Thanks
also are owed to my research assistant on this project, Amanda Dobbins, to Frances
Fendler for her insightful comments, and to The University of Tennessee College of Law
for providing research funding for this project.
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significance of its key findings - women and men exhibit different
investment behaviors and achieve different investment outcomes, and
the resulting female investor profile is closer to existing conceptions
of the reasonable investor than the resulting male investor profile.
As women become bigger players in the securities markets, it
may be comforting to know that they are relatively well protected by
existing conceptions of the reasonable investor. The knowledge that
women are not completely protected by these existing conceptions and
that men are less well protected than women under the current reasonable investor paradigm, however, gives us pause and forces us to
reconsider inaction. To that end, this article continues an ongoing
academic and practical conversation about when changes in investor
protection should be undertaken and how those changes are best
made if they are to be undertaken - not just for the benefit of women
or men, but for the benefit of all underprotected investors.
INTRODUCTION
I.
CURRENT LEGAL CONCEPTIONS OF THE REASONABLEINVESTOR

A. The Rational Investor as ReasonableInvestor
B. The Speculator,the Chartist,and the FundamentalAnalyst
as Reasonable Investor
C. The Sophisticated Investor as Reasonable Investor
D. TheoreticalModels of the ReasonableInvestor
1. The Least Sophisticated Investor
2. The Moody Investor
3. The Moral Investor
II. ATTRIBUTES OF FEMALE INVESTORS
A. Women as IndividualInvestors
1. Amount of Investment Advice/Information
2. Risk Aversion
3. Optimism, Overconfidence, and Perceived Competence
4. TradingFrequency
5. Performance
B. Women as Investment Professionals
1. Behavior
2. Performance
III. SEX AND THE REASONABLE INVESTOR
IV. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE REASONABLE INVESTOR?

A. Market Behavior and the Reasonable Investor
B. Investor Protectionand the Reasonable Investor
CONCLUSION
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INTRODUCTION

In securities fraud litigation based on misstatements or omissions of fact, materiality often is a critical element.' Assuming the
existence of a duty to disclose, only misstatements of material fact
and omissions to state materialfact are potentially actionable under
Rule 10b-5,2 the widely applicable, broadly construed antifraud rule
adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC') under
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended
("1934 Act").3 Decisional law defines materiality in the context of
Rule 10b-5 (and other antifraud rules) through an objective standard
that, as alternatively stated, focuses on the importance or contextual significance of the misstated or omitted fact to the "reasonable
investor."4
This focus underscores the fact that the reasonable investor is
the type of investor that Rule 10b-5 and other antifraud rules aim
to protect. 5 The conception of the reasonable investor, however, is at
best fluid and at worst ill-defined. The descriptive and normative
attributes of the reasonable investor are critically important to the
development of securities fraud law and regulation,6 yet they are
underanalyzed. Recently, a few scholars have undertaken analyses
in this area that begin to conceptualize or theorize the reasonable
1. See Margaret V. Sachs, Materiality and Social Change: The Case for Replacing
"the Reasonable Investor" with "theLeast SophisticatedInvestor" in Inefficient Markets,
81 TuL. L. REv. 473,475 (2006) (noting that the lack ofa"statutory standard of materiality"
leaves courts "to fill the void").
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
4. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (adopting for use under
Rule 10b-5 two alternative formulations of a materiality standard first adopted by the
Court in TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976)). Under Basic, a fact is
material under Rule 10b-5 "if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important" in making an investment decision or if"a substantial
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available."
Id. (quoting TSC, 426 U.S. at 449).
5. Cf. Sachs, supra note 1, at 475-77 (discussing the materiality standard's failure
to protect unsophisticated investors).
6. See Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of
Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REv. 393, 438-40 (2006) (identifying and discussing
the relationship among behavioral biases, materiality, and the reasonable investor under
securities regulation); Larry E. Ribstein, Fraudon a Noisy Market, 10 LEWIs & CLARK
L. REV. 137, 158-59 (2006) (describing and analyzing the relationship among fraud-onthe-market theory, materiality, and the reasonable investor); see generally David A.
Hoffman, The 'Duty" To Be a RationalShareholder,90 MINN. L. REV. 537, 537-42 (2006)
(outlining the critical importance of the concept of the reasonable investor to recoveries
by plaintiff shareholders under federal securities laws).
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investor.7 This article extends that work by inquiring into certain
descriptive and normative characteristics of the reasonable investor
associated with the sex' of that investor. This inquiry aims to answer
a simple question: Is the reasonable investor a woman?
This question may seem like an odd one to ask (and the explorations in this article are certainly only a small piece of an overall
puzzle that I intend to explore in future works), but it arises out of
important empirical studies of investment behavior based on sex.
Specifically, there is emerging evidence that women may behave
and fare differently from men when they engage in securities trading transactions.9 These differences in behavior and outcome are
7. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 6; Peter H. Huang, Moody Investing and the
Supreme Court: Rethinking the Materiality of Information and the Reasonableness of
Investors, 13 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 99 (2005); Sachs, supra note 1.
8. This article looks at empirical evidence sorted by sex, which in the process may
be interpreted as a commentary on gendered characteristics of investors. Moreover, the
differences identified in this article may be biologically determined or socially constructed.
Accordingly, the words "sex" and "gender" (and derivatives of those words) are used
interchangeably.
9. See, e.g., THOMAS J. STANLEY, MILLIONAIRE WOMEN NEXT DOOR: THE MANY
JOURNEYS OF SUCCESSFULAMERICAN BUSINESSWOMEN 49-52 (2004); Stanley M. Atkinson
et al., Do Female Mutual Fund Managers ManageDifferently?, 26 J. FIN. RES. 1 (2003);
Vickie L. Bajtelsmit & Alexandra Bernasek, Why Do Women Invest Differently than
Men?, 7 FIN. COUNSELING & PLAN. 1 (1996); Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Boys
Will Be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock Investment, 116 Q.J. ECON.
261 (2001); Rob Bauer et al., Option Trading and Individual Investor Performance, J.
BANKING & FIN. (forthcoming May 2009) (Dutch study); J. M. Coates & J. Herbert,
Endogenous Steroidsand FinancialRisk Taking on a London TradingFloor, 105 PROC.
NAT'L AcAD. Sci. U.S. 6167, 6167 (2008) (British study); James Felton et al., Preference
for Risk in Investing as a Function of Trait Optimism and Gender, 4 J. BEHAV. FIN. 33
(2003); Robert A. Olsen & Constance M. Cox, The Influence of Gender on the Perception
and Response to Investment Risk: The Case of Professional Investors, 2 J. PSYCHOL. &
FIN. MARKETS 29 (2001); Melanie Powell & David Ansic, Gender Differences in Risk
Behaviour in FinancialDecision-Making:AnExperimentalAnalysis, 18 J. ECON. PSYCHOL.
605 (1997) (English study); Renate Schubert et al., FinancialDecision-Making:AreWomen
Really More Risk-Averse?, 89 AM. ECON. REv. 381 (1999); Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein,
Investment Without Education: The DisparateImpact on Women and Minorities in SelfDirected Defined Contribution Plans, 5 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POLY J. 223 (2001); Ralph
Bluethgen et al., Financial Advice and Individual Investors' Portfolios 13 (Mar. 2008)
(unpublished working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=968197 (German
study); Gary Charness & Uri Gneezy, Strong Evidence for Gender Differences in
Investment (Sept. 18, 2007) (unpublished working paper), availableat http://ssrn.com/
abstract=648735; Charlotte Christiansen et al., Gender, Marriage, and the Decision to
Invest in Stocks and Bonds: Do Single Women Invest More in Less Risky Assets? (Nov. 29,
2006) (unpublished working paper), availableat http'J/ssrn.conabstract--948164 (Danish
study); John R. Graham et al., Investor Competence, Trading Frequency, and Home Bias
2, 11-12, 15-16, 22 (May 29, 2006) (unpublished working paper), availableat http://ssrn
.coniabstract=620801; Anders Karlsson & Lars Nordbn, Benefits of Contribution:
Individual Asset Allocation, Diversification and Welfare in a Defined Contribution Pension
System 14-16, 18, 21 (Nov. 11, 2006) (unpublished working paper), available at http://ssrn
.comabstract=891164 [hereinafter Karlsson & Norddn, Benefits of Contribution]; Anders
Karlsson & Lars Norddn, Investor Competence, Information and Investment Activity
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increasingly important; around the world,1 ° growing numbers of
women are investing in publicly traded securities" and, as the publication of numerous female-targeted popular press books demonstrates, being encouraged to invest in the securities markets (and
elsewhere) in greater amounts and with greater frequency. 2 The
increased participation of women in the securities markets may be
or become market significant or legally significant. Accordingly, it
is relevant to ask whether these female investors, with their different
investment behaviors and outcomes, reflect existing conceptions of
the reasonable investor or suggest the need for a change in current
conceptions of the reasonable investor. This article is designed to
address those questions and to raise related issues involving the need
for legal change.
In furtherance of these objectives, the analysis in this article
proceeds in four parts. In Part I, the article briefly summarizes existing legal conceptions of the reasonable investor in legislative history,
decisional law, and descriptive analysis and highlights related legal
scholarship. Part II describes recent empirical work (principally from
finance and behavioral psychology) on sex-based investment behaviors and outcomes, focusing on both individual female investors and
(to a lesser extent) female investment professionals. Part III compares
and contrasts the information about actual investment behaviors and
outcomes of female investors set forth in Part II with the conceptions
(Feb. 28,2008) (unpublished working paper), availableat http'//ssrn.com/abstract=1007193
[hereinafter Karlsson & Norddn, Investor Competence]; Alexandra Niessen & Stefan
Ruenzi, Sex Matters:GenderDifferences in a ProfessionalSetting (Ctr. for Fin. Research,
Working Paper No. 06-01, 2007); Stacie Garvert, Performance of Female Hedge Fund
Managers (2008) (unpublished M.A.B. thesis, Kansas State University), available at
http://hdl.handle.net/2097/548.
10. Although this article focuses on female investors and law in the United States,
women also are becoming bigger players in the capital markets of other developed and
developing nations. See, e.g., Focus:IndianHousewives Active in Booming Stock Markets,
JAPAN WKLY. MONITOR, Oct. 13, 2007, availableat 2007 WLNR 24108688.
11. See Janet Bennett, Many Happy Returns: Women's Investment Groups Have
Become a Growth Market, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1997, at D5; Janet Bodnar, It Takes Two
to Invest Well, KIPLINGER'S PERS. FIN., Apr. 2007, at 88; Robert Luke, Women Gain
Prominenceas Investors, CHI. TRIB., May 26, 1999, Woman News (Lake Edition), at 8;
Steven Miyao, Funds,Advisers Would Be Wise to Preparefor Women's IncreasingFinancial
Power,MONEY MGMT. ExECuTIvE, Mar. 13, 2006, at 6; Liza Mundy, Women & Investing;
Taking Stock; Who, These Days, Is Not Getting into the Market?, WASH. POST, Sept. 10,
2000, Magazine, at W15; Kathy Wang, InvestorsBecoming Younger andFemale, STANDARD
(Hong Kong), Oct. 26, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 23824226. In the United States,
women have comprised a significant percentage of individual equity investors for at least
twenty-five years. See Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay the CorporateTax in a Flat
Tax World?, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 1209 n.877 (1989) (citing a New York Stock
Exchange survey that found "[tihere were 25,000 more women than men owning stock in
1985, while in 1983, there were 1,159,000 more women than men in the stock market").
12. See, e.g., DAVID BACH, SMART WOMEN FINISH RICH (2d ed. 2002); KIM KIYOSAKI,
RICH WOMAN (2006); SUZE ORMAN, WOMEN & MONEY (2007).
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of the reasonable investor described in Part I, noting that women's
investment behavior conforms better than men's investment behavior to existing reasonable investor models. Then, Part IV assesses the
value of the findings set out in Part III to - and the potential impact
of these findings on - the legal conception of the reasonable investor.
These assessments relate to the protection of female investors, the
overall nature and function of the materiality element in securities
fraud actions under Rule 10b-5 (and, potentially, other antifraud
laws and rules that use the materiality standard), and the efficacy of
disclosure regulation as the primary means of effectuating national
securities policy.
I. CURRENT LEGAL CONCEPTIONS OF THE REASONABLE INVESTOR

Although there is no litmus test for identifying the reasonable
investor, 3 it is possible to identify certain characteristics that are
associated with the reasonable investor. These existing conceptions
of the reasonable investor can be gleaned from Congress, the SEC,
the courts, and commentators (including scholars and practitioners).
Both the nature and source of conceptions of the reasonable investor
raise a number of important unanswered questions. These questions
include whether the notion of the reasonable investor is intended to
be idealized and fixed in time (or whether it may change with changes
in the market), and whether - and if so how - decisional law context
(including the interaction of materiality and other elements of a fraud
claim, e.g., scienter or reliance) affects our view of the reasonable
investor. "4
A. The Rational Investor as ReasonableInvestor
For many, the starting point in thinking about the reasonable
investor is considering whether the reasonable investor must be a
13. Professor David A. Hoffman notes that "[b]oth 'reasonable' and 'investor' have
multiple variants: rational, prudent, informed, lay, and typical; shareholder, stockholder,
businessman, man, and person." Hoffman, supra note 6, at 540 n.12; see also Stefan J.
Padfield, Is Puffery Materialto Investors? Maybe We Should Ask Them, 10 U. PA. J. BUS.
& EMP. L. 339, 344-45 (2008) ('[Clourts have not spoken in one voice on this point, and
other commentators argue that the 'better reasoned authorities have concluded that 10b5 applies to all investors, whether or not sophisticated."); id. at 365 ("[Ihe definition of
'reasonable investor' for purposes of securities regulation is far from settled - stretching
from 'sophisticated' to 'average' to 'nalve'....'.
14. In these regards, Professor Peter H. Huang asserts that the number and types
of securities fraud claims "do and should" vary with actual market activity. Huang,
supranote 7, at 100. Similarly, Professor Margaret V. Sachs asserts that "It]he current
materiality standard for federal securities fraud is a mid-twentieth-century construct
that fails to accommodate certain twenty-first century realities." Sachs, supranote 1, at
473. The discussion in Part IV takes up these unanswered questions to some extent.
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rational investor. More specifically, many may question whether
the reasonable investor must be a rational economic actor - homo
economicus - with wealth maximization as the key attribute. 5 No
doubt, there are advantages to defining reasonableness as rationality in the context of securities regulation. In this regard, Professor
Don Langevoort notes that
[]ike classical economics, both the common law and securities
regulation have long worked largely from the simplifying assumption of the rational actor. Whether or not the assumption is reasonably accurate, it has the virtue of myth: it gives order to the
otherwise chaotic, offering a comforting confidence that behavior
is controllable through simple interventions like disclosure and
contract enforcement. In other words, law has the appearance of
greater power and efficacy if we assume a rational world. Few
doubt that rationality plays a substantial role in ordering the
securities markets. Thus, it should not be surprising that most
doctrinal structures invoke the assumption of dominating rationality. The emphasis in securities law is on making accurate information available; the investor is presumed to be willing and able
to use it wisely."8
Decisional law and the related literature support the view that
the reasonable investor is a rational investor (although judicial decisions are careful not to make this linkage explicit). 7 In fact, one legal
15. See Sachs, supra note 1, at 490 ("Protecting individual investors is largely unnecessary since the 'homo economicus' is well-informed or at least knowledgeable enough
to know when he needs an adviser."); Ronald J. Colombo, Exposing the Myth of Homo
Economicus 2-6 (Hofstra Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research
Paper No. 08-05,2008), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=l189499 (reviewing MORAL
MARKETS (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008)).
16. Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from
BehavioralEconomicsAbout Stockbrokers and SophisticatedCustomers, 84 CAL. L. REV.
627, 699 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
17. See infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text; cf. Betz v. Trainer Wortham & Co.,
519 F.3d 863, 878 (9th Cir. 2008) (seemingly using the word "rational" as the equivalent
of "reasonable" in describing and evaluating investor behavior); Gebhardt v. ConAgra
Foods, Inc., 335 F.3d 824, 830 (8th Cir. 2003) (same). Some courts assume that reasonable investors engage in cost-benefit analyses or weigh certain factors against others.
See, e.g., DeBenedictis v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 492 F.3d 209, 218 (3d Cir. 2007) ("In light
of the other news articles and the concerns expressed in The Wall Street Journalarticle,
The Wall Street Journarsreference to Merrill's suitability training was not enough to
dissipate a reasonable investor's concerns about the fees and costs associated with Class
B shares."); CFTC v. White Pine Trust Corp., No. 04cv2093-J-NLS, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 27218, at *30 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2007) ("Misrepresentations as to the earning
record and history of WPT, the education of WPT employees, Defendant's own employment history, WTs commission structure, and a fictitious positive reference would weigh
heavily on a reasonable investor in deciding whether to invest and, in particular, whether
to make an investment in a potentially high risk market."); Colo. Springs Prod. Credit
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scholar concludes, after analyzing applicable decisional law, that the
reasonable investor, as interpreted in the context of materiality, is
"a proxy for economic rationality"1 8 and that "[r]easonable investors
are platonic models, immune to those behavioral biases and heuristics
which distort the decision making of actual market participants." 9
Another scholar, while raising concerns about the incorporation of
behavioral biases and heuristics into the conceptualization of the reasonable investor, acknowledges that it may be practically impossible
to ignore all elements of irrational behavior.2 ° Yet others argue for,
assume, or support a conceptualization of the reasonable investor
that includes, but may not be limited to, characteristics commonly
associated with the rational investor.2 '
B. The Speculator, the Chartist,and the FundamentalAnalyst as
Reasonable Investor
There is evidence from congressional testimony, for example,
that the concept of the reasonable investor may be broad enough to
include speculators2 2 - even though the literature contrasts speculators with investors. 23 This may be because "[clonventional economic
theory ...generally views speculation as an efficient form of trading
that shifts risk to those who can bear it most easily and improves the
accuracy
of market prices."
21 Speculators are high-risk, high-reward
25 although
market participants;
they typically are well informed about
Ass'n v. Farm Credit Admin., 695 F. Supp. 15, 21 (D.D.C. 1988) ("A reasonable investor's
expectation in purchasing stock is that some return or benefit will be received in return.");
Fradkin v. Ernst, 571 F. Supp. 829, 848 (N.D. Ohio 1983) ("A reasonable investor could
not calculate the actual figures payable from the information disclosed.").
18. Hoffman, supra note 6, at 604.
19. Id. at 594.
20. See Ribstein, supranote 6, at 158-59.
21. See, e.g., Caroline Bradley, Information Society Challenges to FinancialRegulation,
37 U. TOL. L. REv. 307, 314 (2006) (referencing "securities law's model of a rational, reasonable investor who invests based on relevant factual information").
22. H. R. REP. No. 73-1383, pt. II, at 11 (1934) ("No investor, no speculator, can safely
buy and sell securities upon the exchanges without having an intelligent basis for forming
his judgment as to the value of the securities he buys or sells."). Interestingly, however,
the 1934 Act can be seen as legislation intended to curb speculation. See Lynn A. Stout,
Why the Law Hates Speculators:Regulationand PrivateOrderingin the Market for OTC
Derivatives,48 DuKE L.J. 701, 728-33 (1999) (providing a useful history of the relationship
between speculation and the enactment of the 1934 Act). No doubt, some of the confusion
in this area has to do with differences among speculators in motivation, approach, and
other attributes.
23. BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID L. DODD, SECURITYANALYSIS 33-37 (3d ed. 1951); see
also William W. Bratton, Shareholder Value and Auditor Independence, 53 DUKE L.J.
439, 455 (2003) (contrasting speculation and investment).
24. Stout, supra note 22, at 701.
25. See id. at 736.
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the market,2" the sectors, and the corporations in which they invest,"
speculators may sometimes take irrational risks in the nature of
gambling.2 8 Unsurprisingly, given this definition, they are known to
trade in derivative securities.2 9 Moreover, contemporary descriptions
of "noise traders" arguably put them in the camp of speculators."0
In addition to speculators, chartists may be reasonable investors.
In a seminal case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
expressly states that "[t]he speculators and chartists of Wall and Bay
Streets are.., 'reasonable' investors entitled to the same legal protection afforded conservative traders."3 Chartists are investors that
plot historical stock prices and trading volumes and use those charts
to inform their trading decisions.32 Chartism, sometimes referred to
26. See id. at 737.
27. There are many different kinds of speculators. For example, a speculator who
trades with knowledge of the fundamental value of the securities in which he invests has
been termed a "smart money" speculator. Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share PriceAccuracy,
and Economic Performance:The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 348-49 (2003).
Smart money speculators may be contrasted with "'naive' speculators, whose trading is
activated by fads, fashions, or irrational psychological predispositions toward behaviors
such as chasing trends." Id. Smart money speculators may also be seen as a type of
"intelligent speculator" - an informed risk-taker. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 849 n.10 (2d Cir. 1968); see also Huang, supra note 7, at 111 ("[The] description of how
an intelligent speculator behaves remains that of a person who cognitively evaluates and
calculates securities risks .... ). Intelligent speculators can, in turn, be equated or
analogized to sophisticated investors. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
28. A speculator is "[a] knowledgeable, aggressive investor who trades securities to
profit from fluctuating market prices." A HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS LAW TERMS 558 (Bryan
A. Garner ed., 1999); see also Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosurein a GlobalizingMarket:
Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2534 n.72 (1997) ("[A] speculator
is... any investor who chooses her portfolio on the basis of her beliefs concerning the
future returns of available securities rather than randomly or on the basis of the security's
historical Beta. These beliefs are based on the information possessed by the investor.");
Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Disclosureof PreliminaryMergerNegotiations as an Imperfect
Paradigmof Rule lOb-5Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1218, 1235-36 (1987) ("[S]peculation
is defined as the making of investments with the expectation that prospective market
value will vary from current market value over the short term. The basis for this expectation is the belief that the investor has special access to, and has acquired, information that
is not generally available to the market and that has predictive value; or that the investor has special ability to evaluate, and has evaluated, the probability or magnitude of
an event predicted by generally available information more accurately than has the market
as a whole."); Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling? Derivative Securities and FinancialFuturesand Their Effect on the UnderlyingCapital
Markets, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 987, 1002 (1992) ("Speculative investment strategies do not
represent rational behavior. Speculative investing has long been viewed as tantamount
to gambling.").
29. See Robert J. Aalberts & Percy S. Poon, Derivatives and the Modern Prudent
Investor Rule: Too Risky or Too Necessary?, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 525, 552-53 (2006); Frank
Partnoy, FinancialDerivativesand the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage,22 J. CORP. L. 211,
224-26 (1997).
30. See Bratton, supra note 23, at 455-57.
31. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968).
32. See, e.g., Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1182 (7th Cir. 1987) (Cudahy, J.,
concurring) ("[C]hartists and tape-readers find all they need to know about securities in
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as technical analysis, 3 continues to exist in investing and investment
advising even though economic theory, specifically, the weak version
that
of the efficient capital market hypothesis ("ECMH"), indicates
34
chartism should not result in an investment advantage.
Reasonable investors also include those who engage in fundamental analysis, incorporating all publicly available information in
investment decision making.3" "Fundamental analysis (as compared
to technical analysis) focuses on the intrinsic value of stocks. Intrinsic
value is 'the value which is justified by assets, earnings, dividends,
definite prospects, and the factor of management."'3 6 The utility of
fundamental investment analysis is refuted by the semi-strong
version of the ECMH, 7 which holds that mere knowledge of publicly
their price (and sometimes in their volume of trading)."); United States v. Gilbert, 1981
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,244, at 91,610 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 1981) ("[A] 'chartist' is an
investor who makes investment decisions on the basis of the movement of a stock's
volume and price charts, data kept current by the tickertape."); Van Alen v. Dominick &
Dominick, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 389, 392-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (describing the methods of two
chartists); Galfand v. Chestnutt, 402 F. Supp. 1318, 1323-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (describing
the methods of a leading chartist); Thomas Lee Hazen, The Short-Term/Long-Term
Dichotomy and Investment Theory: Implications for Securities Market Regulation and
for CorporateLaw, 70 N.C. L. REV. 137, 150 (1991) ('The chartist makes and interprets
stock charts of past movements of common stock prices and trading volume for clues to
future price movement.").
33. Barbara Ann Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf
Registration:An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REV. 135, 178 n.205 (1984); Roger J.
Dennis, Materialityand the Efficient CapitalMarket Model: A Recipe for the Total Mix,
25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 375 n.5 (1984); Hazen, supra note 32, at 150-53; Henry T.
C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality, 78 TEx. L. REV.
777, 838 (2000); Andrew R. Simmonds et al., Dealing with Anomalies, Confusion and
Contradictionin Fraudon the Market Securities ClassActions, 81 KY. L.J. 123, 139 (1992);
Keith Adam Simon, The MisappropriationTheory: A Valid Applicationof§ 10(b) to Protect
Property Rights in Information,88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1049, 1079 (1998).
34. Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance
Requirements in CertainOpen Market Transactions,62 N.C. L. REV. 435, 438 n.8 (1984);
Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes:The LinearGenealogy
of the Efficient CapitalMarket Hypothesis, 62 GEO.WASH. L.REV. 546, 558, 560-61 (1994);
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty
Years Later: The HindsightBias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 719 (2003); Robert W. Hamilton &
Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and the Real World, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 687,
695 (1997).
35. See Hazen, supra note 32, at 147-50 (describing and commenting on traditional
fundamental analysis).
36. Lewis D. Solomon & Howard B. Dicker, The Crash of 1987: A Legal and Public
PolicyAnalysis, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 191, 245 n.415 (1988); see also Dennis, supra note
33, at 377-78 (noting the emphasis of fundamental analysis on using "publicly available
information... such as industry prospects, expected product developments, and management ability" in evaluating companies); Hazen, supra note 32, at 144 ("Fundamental
analysis involves following the performance of particular companies and attempting to
identify securities whose prices do not fairly reflect the analyst's evaluation of the
company's financial condition.").
37. See Dennis, supranote 33, at 377.
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available information offers investors no advantage because all publicly available information is embedded in market prices.38
C. The SophisticatedInvestor as ReasonableInvestor
For better or for worse, the foregoing conceptions of the reasonable investor indicate expressly or impliedly that the reasonable
investor is a sophisticated trader, an experienced participant in
securities markets who researches investment prospects and has
the ability to understand what the research reveals.3" Sophisticated
investors do not merely receive investment information; they also
process it, using (an assumed level of) knowledge and experience.4"
"[Today's 'reasonable investors' are expected to possess a certain level
of understanding and sophistication .... According to the courts, reasonable investors should understand, for example, the time-value of
money, diversification and risk, and the securities industry's compensation structure."4 1 Although sophistication is not always associated
38. See, for example, Christopher Gulinello, The Mandatory Disclosure of State
CorporateLaw, 86 NEB. L. REv. 795, 817-18 (2008); Christine Hurt, Moral Hazardand
the InitialPublic Offering,26 CARDOZO L. REv. 711,759 (2005); Jonathan Klick & Robert
H. Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and Corporate Control: Evidence From
Hershey's Kiss-Off, 108 CoLUM. L. REV. 749, 797 (2008), for descriptions of the semi-strong
form of the ECMH.
39. Stefan J. Padfield, Who Should Do the Math? Materiality Issues in Disclosures
that Require Investors to Calculatethe Bottom Line, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 927, 939-40 (2007).
40. See, e.g., Gillam v. PG&E Corp., 71 Fed. App'x 711, 712 (9th Cir. 2003) (mem.) ("It
was common knowledge that wholesale electricity costs spiked in 2000, and that the
Utility was not recovering those costs through its retail rates. No reasonable investor
would have ignored the disclosures explaining how the company was treating the resulting
undercollections on its financial statements."); No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council
Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 935 (9th Cir. 2003) (CAreasonable investor would find significant the information regarding a company's deferred
maintenance costs, unsafe maintenance practices, and possible sanction. In addition, a
reasonable investor would consider the potential effects of each of these facts on the
overall economic health of the company as 'significantly alter [ing] the "total mix" of information made available.'" (alteration in original)); Wallace v. Sys. & Computer Tech. Corp.,
1997 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,578, at 97,878-79 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 1997) ("SCT also
disclosed that the Adage acquisition was the first step in entering a new market and that
there would be costs associated with launching this new area of business. A reasonable
investor understands, without being told explicitly, that there are costs and risks involved in attempting to enter and to compete in a new market with new products.").
41. Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along: The Role of Law
in Securities Arbitration,23 CARDOzO L. REV. 991, 1037 (2002) (footnotes omitted); see
also Sachs, supra note 1, at 485 ("'TIThe reasonable investor,' unlike the mere 'reasonable
person,' is someone who grasps market fundamentals."). Professor David Hoffman offers
that
[c]ourts presume that reasonable investors possess certain basic knowledge
and skills. These include understanding: basic ideas about taxation of different investments, that shares may be valued using different methodologies
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with rationality, one legal scholar speculates that a conceptualization
of the reasonable investor as a sophisticated market player may be
a backdoor way of limiting the reasonable investor notion to rational
investors.4 2
Both decisional law and statutory law strongly suggest that the
reasonable investor is sophisticated. In a leading and colorful case
in this area, the Seventh Circuit posits that reasonable investors are
not: "nitwits;" investors having "a child-like simplicity, an inability
to grasp the probabilistic significance of negotiations;" "unsophisticated investors;" "babes in the woods;" or "rubes."4" Rather, reasonable (sophisticated) investors are able to appreciate that mergers
and other planned corporate ventures are not certain until they have
been closed, that the importance of a planned corporate venture
must be balanced against the probability that it will be undertaken,
and that investment involves risk." A conception of the reasonable
investor as sophisticated is the root of several key common law defenses to claims of materiality ("mere puffery," "truth-on-the-market,"
and "bespeaks caution"), as well as a statutory defense (a safe harbor adopted under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (PSLRA"))." These defenses all assume "that the usual 'sophisticated' investor is - and should be - wary and vigilant in sales
interactions."46
Under the "mere puffery" defense, a person against whom a
securities fraud action has been brought argues that alleged misrepresented facts are not materially inaccurate or incomplete because
those alleged facts constitute nothing more than nonspecific, positive
representations. 4 "Statements which are 'mere puffery' are 'vague
and appreciating the differences based on relevant underlying facts, that
corporate managers are self-interested and wish to retain control, and basic
accounting treatment.
Hoffman, supranote 6, at 582 (footnotes omitted). Some commentators even assert that
reasonable investors are, or should be seen as, professional investors in today's markets,
at least in fraud-on-the-market cases. See John M. Newman, Jr. et al., Basic Truths: The
Implications of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory for Evaluating the "Misleading"and
Materiality"Elementsof Securities FraudClaims, 20 J. CORP. L. 571, 572 (1995).
42. Padfield, supra note 13, at 345 ("[Clonceptualizing the reasonable investor as
sophisticated for materiality purposes may impose a duty upon shareholders to be
rational... ').
43. Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 1987).
44. Id.
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c), 78u-5(c) (2006).
46. Langevoort, supra note 16, at 671.
47. See generallyDavid A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV.
1395, 1405-11 (2006) (describing and illustrating the operation of the mere puffery defense
in the context of securities fraud litigation); Jennifer O'Hare, The Resurrection of the
Dodo: The UnfortunateRe-emergence of the Puffery Defense in Private Securities Fraud
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and optimistic' containing 'no concrete factual or material misrepresentation.'" 4 'Mere sales puffery is not actionable under Rule 10b5"49 because it is deemed immaterial as a matter of law. 50 "[Any
reasonable investor knows to be somewhat wary of a selling agent's
oral representations and to check them against the written materials.
Indeed, such statements are well recognized as merely nonactionable 'puffing' on the part of salesmen." 5 In other words, reasonable
(sophisticated) investors would not consider this type of statement
important or a significant alteration to the total mix of available
information.52
Actions, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1697, 1697-1700, 1706-15 (1998) (same); Padfield, supra note
13, at 342-43, 350-61 (same).
48. Brody v. Zix Corp., No. 3:04-CV-1931-K, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69302, at *10
(N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2006); see also Galati v. Commerce Bancorp, Inc., 220 F. App'x 97,
102 (3d Cir. 2007) ("[Sltatements concerning the Company's 'dramatic deposit growth,'
'strong performance,' and 'unique business model,' constitute nothing more than mere
'puffery,' insufficient to sustain a Rule 10b-5 claim."); Pub. Sch. Teachers' Pension & Ret.
Fund v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Ford Motor Co. Sec. Litig.), 381 F.3d 563, 570 (6th Cir. 2004)
("Statements that are 'mere puffing' or 'corporate optimism' may be forward-looking or
'generalized statements of optimism that are not capable of objective verification."'); In
re Vicuron Pharms., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 04-2627, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15613, at *13
(E.D. Pa. July 1, 2005) ("It is well established that 'vague and general statements of
optimism "constitute no more than puffery and are understood by reasonable investors
as such." '").
49. Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 746 (7th Cir. 1997).
50. Hall v. Children's Place Retail Stores, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 8252(SAS), 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 54790, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2008); Congregation of Ezra Sholom v.
Blockbuster, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 2d 151, 161 (N.D. Tex. 2007); Lewis v. Straka, No. 05-C1008, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76716, at *10 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 12, 2006); see also In re Ford
Motor, 381 F.3d at 570 ("'Immaterial statements include vague, soft, puffing statements
or obvious hyperbole' upon which a reasonable investor would not rely.").
51. Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, 735 F. Supp. 1196, 1202 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), superseded
on othergrounds by statute,Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-67, 109 Stat. 737, as recognized in Louros v. Kreicas, F. Supp. 2d 572, 592 n.145
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
52. The judiciary actively connects the puffery defense to at least one of the alternative standards of materiality under the Securities Act of 1933 and the 1934 Act. For
example, one court alludes to the "importance" test of materiality when it notes that
"statements of sales puffery do not support a Rule 10b-5 claim because of their inability
to influence reasonable investors not because of their inherent optimistic nature." In re
Sprint Corp. Sec. Litig., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1216 (D. Kan. 2002). Another court references the "total mix" test for materiality when it concludes, as to specified vague, optimistic
(or at least comforting) statements before it for review, that the
statements are either mere corporate puffery or hyperbole that a reasonable
investor would not view as significantly changing the general gist of available information, and thus, are not material, even if they were misleading.
All public companies praise their products and their objectives. Courts everywhere "have demonstrated a willingness to find immaterial as a matter of
law a certain kind of rosy affirmation commonly heard from corporate
managers and numbingly familiar to the marketplace - loosely optimistic
statements that are so vague, so lacking in specificity, or so clearly constituting the opinions of the speaker, that no reasonable investor could find
them important to the total mix of information available."

304

WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW

[Vol. 15:291

The "truth-on-the-market" defense also relies on some level of
investor sophistication; "[u]nder the 'truth-on-the-market' doctrine,
information already known on the market is also immaterial."53 "In
order to avoid Rule 10b-5 liability, any material information which
insiders fail to disclose must be transmitted to the public with a
degree of intensity and credibility sufficient to effectively counterbalance any misleading impression created by the insiders' one-sided
representations."5 4 The defense assumes the reasonable investor is
informed and understands the information imparted.55
For similar reasons, a statement "that 'bespeaks caution' will not
support an allegation of misrepresentation under Section 10(b)."5
A defendant in a securities fraud action who asserts the 'bespeaks
caution" defense argues that a particular misrepresented or omitted
forward-looking statement of fact is immaterial as a matter of law because tailored cautionary statements have adequately qualified it.57
In re Ford Motor, 381 F.3d at 570-71; see also In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d
525, 538 (3d Cir. 1999) ("[Tlhere is no 'substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the
omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly
altered the 'total mix' of information made available."'). Yet, a criticism leveled at the
mere puffery defense is that it fails to conform to aspects of materiality jurisprudence.
See Padfield, supra note 13, at 353-55.
53. Hall, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54790, at *20; see also Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co.,
228 F.3d 154, 167 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[A] misrepresentation is immaterial if the information
is already known to the market because the misrepresentation cannot then defraud the
market.... A defendant may rebut the presumption that its misrepresentations have
affected the market price of its stock by showing that the truth of the matter was already
known."); In re Intelligroup Sec. Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 262, 293 n.13 (D.N.J. 2007)
("[Tihe 'truth-on-the-market' theory ... dissolves plaintiff's claim by showing that corrective information was 'transmitted to the public' and 'counter-balanced' the allegedly
misleading information by the time the plaintiff executed the challenged transaction."
(citation omitted)); In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., 802 F. Supp. 271, 275 (N.D. Cal.
1992) ("It is ... a defense to a lawsuit premised on the fraud on the market theory
involving a material omission that the market has become aware of the allegedly concealed information.").
54. Schneider v. Vennard (In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig.), 886 F.2d 1109,1116 (9th
Cir. 1989); see also In re Seagate Tech. II, 802 F. Supp. at 275 ("Scrutiny by the press or
by analysts will not ordinarily excuse misleading statements or omissions, and corporations
are not relieved of their duty to disclose material information where that information has
received inadequate exposure from third party sources.").
55. Cf. In re Discovery Labs. Sec. Litig., No. 06-1820, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79823,
at *35 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2006) ('The so-called 'truth on the market' defense does not require
that any investor should be capable of finding the information and understanding its significance based on a single click for a simple Web search. We deal here with reasonable
investors, those who we can assume exercise due investment diligence.").
56. Porter v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 802 F. Supp. 41, 57 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
57. See SEC v. Merch. Capital, LLC, 483 F.3d 747,767 (11th Cir. 2007); P. Stolz Family
P'ship L.P. v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 96-97 (2d Cir. 2004); Kaufman v. Trump's Castle
Funding (In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig.), 7 F.3d 357, 372 (3d Cir. 1993); Hall,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54790 at *20; Marrari v. Med. Staffig Network Holdings, Inc.,
395 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1178 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
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The "bespeaks caution" rule is an application of the commonsense principle that the more a speaker qualifies a statement, the
less people will be misled if the statement turns out to be false.
Or as we put it in Grossman, "[a]t bottom, the 'bespeaks caution'
doctrine stands for the 'unremarkable proposition that statements
must be analyzed in context' when determining whether or not
they are materially misleading." "

Like the mere puffery defense, the bespeaks caution defense exists
because a reasonable (sophisticated) investor would not find forwardlooking statements accompanied by meaningful cautionary language
(1) important to her investment decision making59 or (2) significant
to the total mix of available information. 60
Deriving from the bespeaks caution defense is a similar statutory defense enacted in the PSLRA:6 ' "Under the PSLRA's safe
harbor provision, forward-looking statements are deemed immaterial and non-actionable when they are accompanied by 'meaningful
cautionary statements identifying important factors that could
cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forwardlooking statements."'6 2 Although the PSLRA safe harbor provision
58. United States v. Nacchio, 519 F.3d 1140, 1161 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Grossman
v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1120 (10th Cir. 1997)).
59. E.g., Halperin v. eBanker USA.COM, Inc., 295 F.3d 352, 357 (2d Cir. 2002)
("Certain alleged misrepresentations... are immaterial as a matter of law because it
cannot be said that any reasonable investor could consider them important in light of
adequate cautionary language set out in the same offering."); see also Rombach v. Chang,
355 F.3d 164, 173 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Halperin,295 F.3d at 357); Treeline Inv. Partners,
LP v. Koren, No. 07 Civ. 1964 (DLC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47748, at *21-22 (S.D.N.Y.
July 3, 2007) (citing Rombach, 355 F.3d at 173).
60. E.g., Halperin, 295 F.3d at 357 ('The touchstone of the inquiry is not whether
isolated statements within a document were true, but whether defendants' representations or omissions, considered together and in context, would affect the total mix
of information and thereby mislead a reasonable investor regarding the nature of the
securities offered."); see also Rombach, 355 F.3d at 173 (citing Halperin,295 F.3d at 357);
In re Donald J. Trump Casino, 7 F.3d at 371 ("[W]hen an offering document's forecasts,
opinions or projections are accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements, the forwardlooking statements will not form the basis for a securities fraud claim if those statements
did not affect the 'total mix' of information the document provided investors."); Treeline
Inv. Partners,2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47748, at *21-22 (citing Rombach, 355 F.3d at 173).
61. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(1)(A), 78u-5(c)(1) (2006); In re Blockbuster Inc. Sec. Litig.,
No. 3:03-CV-0398-M (LEAD), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7173, at *12-13 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 26,
2004) CThe PSLRA safe harborisaaspects
of... the judicial[ly] created "bespeaks
caution" doctrine."' (alteration in original)); In re Unicapital Corp. Sec. Litig., 149 F. Supp.
2d 1353, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2001) ("[The PSLRA codified a version of the bespeaks caution
doctrine in what is referred to as the safe-harbor provision."); Credit Suisse First Boston
Corp. v. ARM Fin. Group, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 12046 (WHP), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3332,
at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2001) ('CThe Reform Act's safe harbor was modeled in part
after, but not meant to displace, the judicial bespeaks caution doctrine.").
62. Hall, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54790, at *20; accord Congregation of Ezra Sholom
v. Blockbuster, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 2d 151, 162 (N.D. Tex. 2007); In re Michaels Stores,
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and the bespeaks caution doctrine may not always be jointly applicable (given differences in the circumstances each defense covers),
the seeming foundational importance of sophistication to the PSLRA
statutory defense is identical to that of the bespeaks caution defense;
the safe harbor assumes that the reasonable investor is informed
and able to balance forward-looking representations with cautionary
information.
Even if not sophisticated, a reasonable investor certainly is informed. In fact, the Securities Act of 1933, as amended ("1933 Act"),
and the 1934 Act, by using disclosure as a vehicle for effectuating the
promotion of investor protection and market integrity, effectively
ordain that the reasonable investor must be informed. Accordingly,
an informed investor incorporates all publicly available information
into her decision making. Decisional law and academic literature,
in fact, assume an informed investor.' The importance of information
to the reasonable investor and the reasonable investor's view on the
significance of information to the total mix of available information
are only relevant when assessed in relation to an informed investor.
D. Theoretical Models of the ReasonableInvestor
Finally, before identifying and assessing the attributes of female
investors in the context of these existing characterizations of the reasonable investor, it is important to touch on a few recent theoretical
conceptions of the reasonable investor in the context of securities
fraud scholarship. These theoretical constructs reflect and comment
Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 3:03-CV-0246-M (Lead), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24919, at *18-19 (N.D.
Tex. Dec. 10, 2004); In re QLT Inc. Sec. Litig., 312 F. Supp. 2d 526, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2004);
Friedman v. Rayovac Corp., 295 F. Supp. 2d 957, 988-89 (W.D. Wis. 2003); In re S1 Corp.
Sec. Litig., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1352 (N.D. Ga. 2001); In re Unicapital,149 F. Supp. 2d
at 1373; In re ValuJet, Inc., Sec. Litig., 984 F. Supp. 1472, 1479 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
63. See, e.g., Baron v. Smith, 380 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding that plaintiffs'
claim failed because of disclosure of "the material facts that would lead a reasonable investor to make an informed decision"); In re Intelligroup Sec. Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 262,
291 (D.N.J. 2007) ('The test of materiality depends not upon the literal truth of statements
but upon the ability of reasonable investors to become accurately informed."); In re PDI
Sec. Litig., No. 02-211 (GEB), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80142, at *27 (D.N.J. Nov. 2,2006)
(same); Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practiceof Securities Disclosure,61 BROOK.
L. REv. 763, 818 (1995) ('CThe 'reasonable investor,' having been informed that Basic
knew of no corporate development that would result in the high trading activity, would,
without doubt, have thought that disclosure of the fact that acquisition was being discussed
'significantly altered the "total mix" of information made available.'"(quoting Basic v.
Levinson, 786 F.2d 741, 748 (6th Cir. 1986))); Cheryl Nichols, H.R. 2179, the Securities
FraudDeterrence and Investor RestitutionAct of 2004: A Testament to Selective Federal
Preemption, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 533, 544 (2008) ("The federal securities
laws are based on the principle of disclosure of all material information required by a
reasonable investor to make an informed investment decision.").
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on relevant market and situational contexts, as well as policy considerations and doctrine.
1. The Least Sophisticated Investor
In a recent article focusing on the notion of materiality in inefficient markets, Professor Margaret Sachs argues for a contextual
construct of "the least sophisticated investor," rather than the reasonable investor.' The least sophisticated investor is a person of "below
average... intelligence" who lacks the sophistication commonly associated with reasonable investors.6 5 Professor Sachs is specifically
concerned with the impact of the materiality standard in securities
fraud litigation on what she terms "underclass investors," such as
the elderly, immigrants, and others with limited financial literacy.6 6
She asserts that these market participants deserve protection when
they invest in inefficient markets and that the reasonable investor
standard will not afford them that protection.6 7 Furthermore, she
notes that some courts are addressing this issue in piecemeal ways
that threaten the stability of existing conceptions of the reasonable
investor.6 8 Accordingly, she proposes a more intellectually honest
approach in which the nature of the protected class of investors is
different for transactions consummated in inefficient markets. 69 It
is important to note that Professor Sachs balances her proposed lower
threshold for materiality, in reference to the least sophisticated investor, with a companion change in existing doctrine: the adoption
of a heightened level of scienter.7 ° The suggested doctrinal changes
are strongly linked to the promotion of investor protection and market integrity.7 1
2. The Moody Investor
Professor Peter Huang proposes taking into account the "moody
investor" and making related changes to existing law; he focuses
particularly on making changes to the "mere puffery" and "bespeaks
caution" defenses.7 2 Moody investing occurs outside the realm of rational economic decision making and "refers to investing that is (at
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Sachs, supra note 1, at 473.
Id. at 504 (alteration in original).
Id. at 476-77, 494-95.
Id. at 476-77.
Id. at 479.

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 502.
Id. at 502-07.
See id. at 501-08.
Huang, supra note 7, at 127-29.
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least, partially) non-cognitive." 7 3 Moody investing, arising out of
myriad environmental stimuli, affects market participants and markets.74 As Professor Huang explains,
there is empirical data that moody investing not only occurs, but
also affects securities prices and market performance. Experimental research finds that individuals evaluate stocks not in
terms of the relationships between risk and return, but instead
based upon their global attitudes towards those stocks. Experimental research indicates that "factors other than technical fundamentals are often used by market participants to gauge the
value of securities. This phenomenon may be quite prevalent in
markets for IPOs, where securities lack a financial history. The
imagery and affect associated with securities can be a powerful
basis upon which to judge their worth." Affect and images crucially shape people's attitudes towards securities and their judgments concerning securities. On the positive affect side, in 2000
and 2001, a $3 million advertising campaign in European and
Asian magazines and newspapers introduced a series of global
mutual funds alongside fashion supermodels and contained the
affective tagline: "the most beautiful investments in the world."
On the negative affect side, perceived dangers of genetically manipulated organisms can stigmatize biotechnological stocks. Longterm financial images tend to be more positive than short-term
financial images. Finally, a recent event study documented that
followed
positive abnormal returns and increased trading volume
75
a company's Super Bowl television commercials.
According to Professor Huang, even mandatory disclosure documents
have the capacity to influence moods 7 6 Ultimately, he effectively
argues that the presence of moody investing in the market should
change our conception of the reasonable investor and, therefore, the
nature of certain defenses in securities fraud actions.7 ' His rationale
is that absent a change, some investors remain vulnerable, and the
integrity of the securities markets is not adequately protected under
existing conceptions. In this way, Professor Huang directly links his
argument to both policy and doctrine7.
3. The Moral Investor
Finally, a recently released book review suggests the need for
us to consider the relevance of the "moral investor" to securities
73. Id. at 102-03.
74. Id. at 102-05, 120.

75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 103-04 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 105.
Id. at 128.
Id.
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regulation.79 Although the review directly addresses the moral man
as wrongdoer (rather than as an investor, a market participant who
may require protection), its broader message clearly encompasses
the active presence, recognition, and reinforcement of morality (in
addition to law, economics, and behavioral science) in markets." Although existing legal doctrine does not directly support recognition
and protection of the moral investor,8 1 legal respect for the moral
investor in the securities fraud context is likely to promote market
integrity if, as the review suggests, the securities markets are moral.
II. ATTRIBUTES OF FEMALE INVESTORS
The prevailing actual and theoretical conceptions of the reasonable investor described in Part I offer descriptive and normative guidance on the class of persons the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act intend to
protect through the judicially created materiality standard. This part
provides information on the behavior and outcomes of actual participants in the market, specifically, female investors. By understanding
the conceptions of the reasonable investor in Part I and the attributes
of female securities traders identified in this part, we can assess in
Part III whether women are well protected in securities fraud litigation by the existing materiality standard and whether existing conceptions of the standard continue to be appropriate or desirable given
current market characteristics.
Until the last part of the twentieth century, women were not
notable participants in the U.S. capital markets.8 2 Early noteworthy
female investors were not mainstream actors or advisors;83 in some
cases, they were distinguishable from their male-majority peers on
more bases than their sex. For example, in the late nineteenth century, Evangeline Adams used fortune telling to predict market movements.' Although "[s]he was an obvious quack with no real investment
knowledge,"8 5 famous investors and other wealthy people, including
J.P. Morgan and Charles Schwab, actively sought her advice." Hetty
79. Colombo, supranote 15, at 27 ("[I]n confronting misconduct in the marketplace....
policymakers can take into account both the moral promise, and the moral shortcomings,
of modern men and women, affording access to important supplementary solutions to the
problems affecting contemporary capitalism and society.').
80. Id. at 3-6.
81. Id. at 22-27.
82. See, e.g., KENNETH L. FISHER, 100MINDSTHATMADETHE MARKET 190-91, 263-65,
371-74 (2007) (including only three women among his profiles of 100 notable historic
leaders in securities trading markets).
83. See id. (describing the three women's backgrounds as socialite, fortune teller, and
heiress).
84. Id. at 264.
85. Id. at 265.
86. Id. at 264.
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Green, a late nineteenth-century female investor, had a more traditional investment approach; she was a ruthless, miserly woman who
relied on some contrarian investments, ostensible tips, and compound
interest principles to yield her desired six percent return.8 7 Later, in
the early twentieth century, Natalie Schenk Laimbeer became the
first woman to hold an executive title (albeit for a short time) on
Wall Street.'
Even though women are commonplace in the markets today, they
are not the stereotypical, prototypical, or mainstream model of an
investor or investment professional.8" Among other things, female
investors (including investment professionals) face certain distinct
disadvantages as new, limited participants in the securities markets - disadvantages intertwined with the nature and extent of their
participation in the labor force, wage differentials, disproportionate
responsibility for child and elder care, and other gender-dependent
or sex-based differences.' The increased participation of women in
U.S. securities trading markets, however, enables us to identify attributes of female investors, as both individuals and market professionals, that may characterize their participation in those markets
or distinguish them from male investors.
A. Women as Individual Investors
Individual female investors exhibit trading behaviors different
from those of male investors, whether investing directly in markettraded securities or allocating funds in self-directed retirement
87. Id. at 371-74.
88. Id. at 190-91. For health reasons, her tenure as a market professional was quite
short. Id. at 191.
89. E.g., Barber & Odean, supra note 9, at 265 ("[C]asual observation reveals that
men are disproportionately represented in the financial industry."); id. at 267 (noting
that female investors comprised only twenty-one percent of the investors represented in
the study); Sam Barrett, Male v Female Investment Styles, MONEYWISE, Apr. 17, 2007,
http://www.iii.co.uk/articles/articledisplay.jsp?section=Planning&article-id=6339415
('From the trading floor to the upper echelons of fund management companies, men dominate the investment arena.") (English publication); Bethany McLean, Where the Girls
Aren't, FORTUNE, Nov. 14, 2005, at 139, 139 availableat httpJ/money.cnn.com/magazinest
fortune/fortunearchive2005/11/14/8360699/index.htm ('The financial services industry
isn't known for being particularly female-friendly; not many women are mutual fund
managers either.'); Mundy, supra note 11, at W15 (If investors, increasingly, are female,
it's still true that most brokers and investment advisers are male.').
90. See Bajtelsmit & Bernasek, supra note 9, at 7; Janis Sarra, The Gender
Implications of Corporate Governance Change, 1 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 457, 462,
464-68 (2002); What Every Boomer Woman Needs to Know About Planningfor Retirement,
WOMEN & INVESTING (Oppenheimer Funds, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Aug. 21, 2008, at 1-2,
available at https://www.oppenheimerfunds.com/digitalAssets/afc9c2f9f898d1OVgnVCM
100000e82311ac_-0.pdf.

20091

FEMALE INVESTORS AND SECURITIES FRAUD

vehicles. These behaviors have been observed, analyzed, and documented in a growing body of finance literature and media coverage.
1. Amount of Investment Advice/Information
Although men generally spend more resources, time, and money
on acquiring investment information,9 women are more likely to seek
investment advice than men.92 This behavior may result from women's
relative lack of investment confidence and their self-perceived in93
competence:
Behavioral finance suggests that young and male investors
seek relatively less advice since they are more likely to be subject
to overconfidence bias. They may consider themselves particularly
astute in financial matters. Moreover, they may be more likely
to have easy access to low-cost information providers such as the
internet. Both effects will reduce the perceived marginal benefits
from advice.'
Some assert that women not only seek more investment advice than
men, but also research and understand their investments more than
men - although empirical support for that assertion is elusive.9 5
91. See Barber & Odean, supra note 9, at 265; Wilbur G. Lewellen et al., Patternsof
Investment Strategy and Behavior Among Individual Investors, 50 J. Bus. 296, 311-12
(1977).
92. Lewellen et al., supra note 91, at 311 ("In general, male investors claim to do
considerably more of their own security analysis and allege spending more time and
money on that activity than do women. The latter tend to rely heavily on their broker's
(account executive's) advice for portfolio decisions.'); Zanglein, supra note 9, at 241-42
(indicating that sixty-two percent of women and forty-nine percent of men seek investment advice from a financial professional); Bluethgen et al., supra note 9, at 13, 14, 22;
Press Release, Merrill Lynch Inv. Managers, Merrill Lynch Investment Managers (MLIM)
Survey Finds: When it Comes to Investing, Gender a Strong Influence on Behavior
(Apr. 18, 2005), http://www.ml.com/media/47547.pdf; Why Do MutualFund Investors Use
ProfessionalFinancialAdvisers?, 16 RES. FUNDAMENTAlS (Inv. Co. Inst., Washington,
D.C.), Apr. 2007, at 1, 7, availableat http://www.ici.org/pdf/ fm-vl6nl.pdf (noting that
women financial decision makers, among other groups, are more likely to seek ongoing
financial advice).
93. Press Release, Merrill Lynch Inv. Managers, supranote 92; see infranotes 113-20
and accompanying text.
94. Bluethgen et al., supra note 9, at 12 (citation omitted). Interestingly, men may
receive different investment advice than women. See Bajtelsmit & Bernasek, supranote
9, at 6-7 (describing gender-based investment information disparities).
95. See, e.g., Press Release, Merrill Lynch Inv. Managers, supranote 92 ("Men are...
more likely than women to ... buy a hot investment without doing any research ....

Of

men who reported buying a stock without doing any research, 63% said they did it again,
whereas only 47% of women repeated the mistake."); Barrett, supra note 89 (noting that
women research and understand "what they invest in more than their male counterparts
[and] also appear to dedicate more time to learning about investing in general"); Investment
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Another hypothesis is that men may process investment information differently than women do,96 and there is evidence of this in the
literature.97
2. Risk Aversion
Women generally are more risk averse in their investment behavior than men.9 8 Interestingly, this behavior is exhibited crossculturally.9 9 For example, a Danish study finds that "single women
Habits of Men vs. Women, MONEY MGMT. NEWSLETTER (Fiscal Agents, Oakville, Ont.),
Sept. 2003, http://www.fiscalagents.com/newsletter/4habits.shtml ("Research has shown
that men tend not to want too much detail while women want more information. Women
tend to really want to understand what's being suggested, and why. A poll conducted in
the U.S. in the late 1990s found that women spend 40% more time researching a mutual
fund before they invest.").
96. See, e.g., infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
97. See generally Powell & Ansic, supra note 9, at 606-10, 623-24 (describing relevant
literature and finding differences in female and male investment decision making that
are not explained by other factors).
98. See Bajtelsmit & Bernasek, supranote 9, at 1 ("An increasing number of financial
studies conclude that women invest their asset portfolios more conservatively than their
male counterparts .... "); id. at 2 ("When asked to choose between four statements
regarding their risk-return tradeoff, 63% of the single women and 57% of the married
women report that they are not willing to accept any financial risk at all (compared to
43% of single men and 41% of married men in the sample)."); id. at 5 ("[W]omen, on
average, will hold a smaller dollar value of risky assets in their investment portfolios than
men.... [W]omen are relatively more risk averse than men i.e. they will hold a smaller
proportion of their portfolio in risky assets.'); Barber & Odean, supra note 9, at 285-86
(surveying study results to this effect); Bauer et al., supra note 9 (manuscript at 15)
("[T]he portfolios held by women have significantly lower risk exposures than do those
held by men.'); Felton et al., supra note 9, at 33 ("IN]on-professional women investors
have been found to allocate less of their portfolios to volatile assets.. . .'); Hoffman, supra
note 6, at 600 ("One basic and well-established conclusion is that men and women perceive
risk differently. Many studies have found that on average, men are more comfortable
with higher levels of risk, particularly environmental risks than women. Women thus
exhibit higher rates of loss-aversion than men in evaluating financial investments."
(footnotes omitted)); Powell & Ansic, supranote 9, at 607 ("[Tjhe one gender difference
which is persistently found in both the general and business specific literature is a lower
preference for risk amongst females."); Zanglein, supra note 9, at 239-41 (detailing
elements of women's risk aversion in making investment decisions); Charness & Gneezy,
supra note 9, at 13 ("Women make smaller investments than do men, and so appear to
be financially more risk averse.'); Christiansen et al., supra note 9, at 1 C'The general finding in the literature is that women choose less risky portfolios than men which suggests
that women have a stronger aversion against taking on financial risk .... "). But see
Schubert et al., supra note 9, at 384-85 (finding, in a Swiss study, that female risk aversion
in financial decision making is neither consistent nor pervasive).
99. Powell & Ansic, supra note 9, at 623 ('The evidence supports the view that gender
differences in financial risk preference exist in management populations and are not
explained by the context instance of familiarity, ambiguity or gains and loss framing.');
Charness & Gneezy, supranote 9, at 2 (noting that the subjects represented in their data
set varied by country, among other things); Christiansen et al., supra note 9, at 3 ("mhe
finding that women make less risky investment decisions than men also holds in a large
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have a lower propensity to invest in stocks and a higher propensity
to invest in bonds, than... married women and men (married and
single)."'" Risk aversion may manifest itself in a number of ways,
including through portfolio asset allocation (e.g., favoring bonds over
equities or investing no or less money capital in initial public offerings and derivative securities) and loss-aversion behaviors. 10 Risk
averse, conservative investment behavior typically is associated with
lower returns. 0 2
3. Optimism, Overconfidence, and Perceived Competence
Female investors may be less optimistic and less overconfident
than their male counterparts. In addition, female investors typically
perceive themselves as lacking in investment competence more than
male investors.'0 3 These three traits may be interrelated and also
inversely correlated with portfolio risk."°4
"In general, optimists are more likely to engage in active coping
in an attempt to overcome negative life events, while pessimists are
more likely to withdraw and disengage."'0 5 When optimists cope, they
seek out information;0 6 when they process the information they obtain, optimists may irrationally favor positive information. 7 This
combination of traits may have negative ramifications for the optimist investor.
[W]hen faced with a downturn in market performance, optimists'
tendency to engage in active forms of coping may lead to a greater
data set that is not influenced by self-selection issues and that takes into account that
a large fraction of the population does not invest in financial assets.").
100. Christiansen et al., supra note 9, at 13. Moreover, as a further indication of risk
aversion, "single women tend to hold a smaller ratio of stocks and a larger ratio of bonds
in their asset portfolio." Id.
101. See supra note 98.
102. E.g., Bajtelsmit & Bernasek, supra note 9, at 1 ("All other things equal, a conservative investment strategy results in less retirement income on average than a more
aggressive strategy.").
103. Barber & Odean, supra note 9, at 264-65; Graham et al., supra note 9, at 2, 12.
104. Barber & Odean, supra note 9, at 263-64 (noting that overconfident investors
"hold unrealistic beliefs about how high their returns will be and how precisely these can
be estimated" and "hold riskier portfolios than do rational investors with the same degree
of risk aversion"); id. at 265 (describing research that links investor overconfidence to
"self-serving attribution bias," overattribution of investment success to one's own investment ability); Felton et al., supra note 9, at 37 ("[Mien took on significantly greater risk
in the form of futures and options contracts than did women, and this difference was driven
primarily by optimistic men.").
105. Felton et al., supra note 9, at 34.
106. See id.
107. See id. ("Recent research suggests that optimists have an unconscious attentional
bias for positive information . .").
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propensity to sell holdings that have recently performed poorly
and shift money into more risky investments in an attempt to
regain losses. Pessimists, in contrast, tend to withdraw when
faced with negative information. In this case, that may mean
holding assets and riding out the market downturn, which in the
long run may be a more optimal strategy.10
Optimism has been associated with risk taking, including in the area
of investment decision making; °9 "there is reason to believe that the
same coping strategies and cognitive tendencies that prove beneficial in health domains may lead to more risky choices in investment
domains." 110 A recent study found that male optimism is related to
relationship is complex and has
investment risk taking."' But the
112
not yet been fully investigated.
In matters of finance and other decision making deemed to be
a "masculine task," men typically exhibit overconfidence more often
than women." 3 "[O]verconfident investors.., believe that the precision of their knowledge about the value of a security is greater
than it actually is... ." 1"Evidence of men's overconfidence is both
empirical and anecdotal." 5
Alexander Elder, who specialises in the psychology of trading,
says women are more realistic and less ego-driven. "They are not
afraid to ask difficult questions and they have less tolerance for
pain. Men like to prove that they can handle the pain, and that's
what gets them into trouble.""'
Relative levels of investment confidence may be interrelated with perceptions of investment competence." 7 In general, female investors
108. Id. at 34-35.
109. See id. at 34 ("Some have suggested that a potential drawback to optimism may
be a greater tendency to choose risky options. The reasoning is that if one has positive
expectancies about the future, then there is little need to worry about the potentially
negative consequences of a risky decision." (citations omitted)).
110. Id. at 35.
111. Id. at 38 ("Optimistic men were active in the futures and options market, while
pessimistic men were more active in the more conservative New York Stock Exchange.").
112. See id. (speculating about unknown aspects of the relationships among gender,
optimism, and risk-taking behavior).
113. Barber & Odean, supra note 9, at 264-65.
114. Id. at 261-62.
115. Id. at 275; see Saskia Scholtes, Wall Street's GenderAgenda,FIN. TIMES (London),
Feb. 28, 2007, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/30714818-c6d2-1ldb-8f4f-000b5
df10621.html (discussing reasons for and consequences of men's overconfidence on the
trading floor).
116. Scholtes, supra note 115.
117. See Barber & Odean, supra note 9, at 265 (describing sex-based relationships
between ability assessments and overconfidence); Graham et al., supra note 9, at 15-18
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rate their investment competence lower than male investors; 118 male
investors believe they are more competent than female investors." 9
Certain kinds of men2 may
be more likely to exhibit evidence of com0
petence than others.
4. TradingFrequency
Overconfidence (and perceived competence) in investment decision making may be related to another trait shared by male investors: overconfident investors may trade more frequently than other
investors. 2 ' Consistent with this observation, researchers and other
commentators observe that women trade less frequently than men.'22
Women who rely on investment advice to manage their portfolios,
however, typically trade more frequently than they otherwise would
(and incur related costs) as a result of that advice.' 2 3
5. Performance
Research also provides some evidence that investments made
by women for their own account perform better, more consistently,
or persistently stronger than those made by men for their own
(noting that overconfidence and perceived investor competence are correlated and offer
alternative explanations for portfolio turnover); see also Press Release, Merrill Lynch
Inv.Managers, supra note 92 (noting survey findings that "[a] significantly greater percentage of women (47%) than men (30%) report not being knowledgeable about investing).
118. Graham et al., supra note 9, at 12.
119. Id. at 2 ("[M]ale investors, and investors with larger portfolios and more education,
are more likely to believe they are competent than are female investors, and those with
smaller portfolios and less education.").
120. See Karlsson & Norddn, Investor Competence, supranote 9, at 6 ("[W]e... find
that highly educated men, in the highest income brackets, are more likely to believe they
are competent than women with less education and lower income.").
121. Barber & Odean, supranote 9, at 263 ("Overconfident investors.., lower their
expected utility by trading too much...."); Graham et al., supra note 9, at 23 ('[Investors
who feel more competent tend to trade more frequently than investors who feel less
competent.").
122. Barber & Odean, supra note 9, at 262 ("[Ihe average turnover rate of common
stocks for men is nearly one and a half times that for women."); Felton et al., supranote
9, at 37 ("Males made significantly more transactions... than females ....
");
Lewellen
et al., supranote 91, at 312 ("[Tirades appear to occur more often, and they clearly are
in larger denominations among higher-income- particularly male - investors."); Susan
J. Stabile, Enron, Global Crossing,andBeyond: Implications for Workers, 76 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 815, 828 (2002) ("[Wlomen generally trade securities less frequently than men,
favoring a more long-term or relational approach to investment.").
123. See Bluethgen et al., supra note 9, at 22 ("[Flinancial advice enhances (international) portfolio diversification and adds discipline to the asset allocation decision by
using model portfolios. Nevertheless, advice comes at a cost in the form of increased
portfolio turnover accompanied by relatively higher transaction fees.!).
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account.' 2 4 Evidence of women's better, more consistent, and more
persistent investment performance is not universal; 125 but to the
extent that these performance attributes exist, women's different
investment results may be connected to the decreased frequency with
which women trade.1 26 In fact, women's investments may perform
less well than those of some men and more well than those of other
men to the extent that men's portfolios tend to have greater variability than women's portfolios.' 27 Women's achievement of better
investment performance may indicate that the risk aversion exhibited by women in investment contexts (which tends to lead to lower
returns)'28 may not be as strong a predictor of performance as other
factors, including overconfidence. 2 In fact, in a recent survey, more
men than women reported that overconfidence played a role in investment mistakes they made.3 °
Finally, it is important to note that biological differences and
changes also may impact securities trading performance, according
to a recently released study. 3 ' Specifically, researchers found morning testosterone levels to be predictors of a day's trading profitability,
and cortisol levels correlated with variance in trading results and
market volatility. 3 2 The authors note that their study was of relatively short duration (involving sampling over an eight-day period)
and that sustained hormonal effects may have more significant
124. See Luke, supranote 11 (noting that women-only investor clubs outperform menonly and mixed-gender investment clubs); Scholtes, supranote 115 (noting study results
indicating that women's investments perform better than men's); Bauer et al., supra
note 9 (manuscript at 12) ("[P]ortfolios held by women outperform those of men....").
125. See, e.g., Felton et al., supranote 9, at 37 (noting that although men may be more
likely to take risks, the overall performance of portfolios in the study did not differ significantly by gender and men often performed at the highest levels).
126. See Barber & Odean, supra note 9, at 262, 275-77 ("While both men and women
reduce their net returns through trading, men do so by 0.94 percentage points more a
year than do women."); id. at 289 ("Men trade more than women and thereby reduce
their returns more so than do women."); Felton et al., supra note 9, at 37 ("As expected
given males' greater propensity for risk, their performance varied to a significantly greater
degree... than females' performance did.. ."). But see Karlsson & Norddn, Benefits of
Contribution, supra note 9, at 1, 21 (discussing the finding, in a Swedish pension fund
study, that men outperform women). Women's less active trading patterns are not always
beneficial, in particular when trading is essential to ensure greater returns. See Stabile,
supra note 122, at 828 ("[Less frequent trading] is an investment trait that generally
works to women's benefit. In the case of employer securities, however, it may lead them
to stay with their employer investments longer than is wise." (footnote omitted)).
127. See Felton et al., supranote 9, at 37.
128. See supranote 102 and accompanying text.
129. See Barber & Odean, supra note 9, at 286.
130. Press Release, Merrill Lynch Inv.Managers, supra note 92.
131. Coates & Herbert, supra note 9, at 6167-71.
132. Id. at 6168-69.
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influence on trading behaviors.' 33 They also apply their results to
recognized market phenomena and conclude that
[c]ortisol is likely ... to rise in a market crash and, by
increasing risk aversion, to exaggerate the market's downward
movement. Testosterone, on the other hand, is likely to rise in a
bubble and, by increasing risk taking, to exaggerate the market's
upward movement. These steroid feedback loops may help explain
why people caught up in bubbles
and crashes often find it difficult
34
to make rational choices.1
One of the study authors notes that women have one-tenth of the testosterone that men have and that women likely produce less cortisol
than men. Accordingly, these results indicate that differences in trading outcomes between women and men are potentially sex based.
Biology-oriented research of this kind may help reveal the bases for
observed differences in investment behavior and performance between women and men.
B. Women as Investment Professionals
Evidence is mixed as to whether, and if so, in what ways, women
behave differently when making investment decisions on behalf of
other investors and institutions than they do when making investments for their own account. Women have been significant players
in managing other people's investments for a number of years.3 5
Their participation in the professional investment community has
been steadily increasing, including in the hedge fund arena. 136 Still,
women are a significant minority in the investment management and
advisory community. 137 Studies in this area are few, and the results
are inconclusive.
1. Behavior
Some studies indicate that "[p]rofessional female and male fund
managers appear to exhibit similar investment behavior." 131 Others
133. Id. at 6170 ("[m1f acutely raised steroids were to persist for several weeks or even
increase as volatility rises, they might have cognitive and behavioral consequences, specifically by shifting risk preferences or disturbing the neural basis for rational choice.").
134. Id. at 6170-71.
135. See Judith G. Greenberg, Insider Trading and Family Values, 4 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 303, 322 n.89 (1998).
136. See Garvert, supra note 9, at 4.
137. See supranote 89 and accompanying text.
138. Atkinson et al., supra note 9, at 2.

318

WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW

[Vol. 15:291

suggest that mutual fund managers, in the aggregate, may exhibit
the same gender-based behaviors described supra in Part II.A with women investing more conservatively, less optimistically, less
overconfidently, with less perceived competence, and less frequently
than men (and with better cost-adjusted returns)." 9 Still other studies
yield more anomalous, mixed, or ambiguous results. 4 °
In a study of taxable fixed-income funds, researchers (Atkinson
et al.) specifically found no overall difference in the risk profile of portfolios managed by women and men.141 The same study also showed
less of a difference in turnover ratios between female and male investment managers than prior research had shown, although the study
did find that funds managed by women exhibit less turnover in nearly
half of fund categories.'4 2 The authors attribute the difference between their results and those reported in other studies of female investors (in which more significant gender difference was found) to the
fact that their study controlled for "investment expertise."''
In contrast, Niessen and Ruenzi, in a study of female-managed
and male-managed U.S. mutual funds, find differences in the risk
aversion of female and male mutual fund managers.' 44 The variation
is attributable in part to sex-based differences in unsystematic risk,'45
perhaps due to the fact that "[flemale fund managers follow less extreme investment styles than male fund managers."' 46 Niessen and
Ruenzi, like Atkinson and his colleagues, find "that female [mutual]
139. See Barber & Odean, supra note 9, at 288; Felton et al., supra note 9, at 33 ("[R]isk
aversion on the part of women has also been demonstrated in professional financial
analysts."); Garvert, supranote 9, at 32 ("Women tend to take less risk and their overall
return risk did differ compared to the 14 male managed funds."). In most cases, however,

the observed differences between men and women in studies of investment professionals
are less pronounced than those in studies of individual investors. See infra notes 138 &
145 and accompanying text.
140. Olsen & Cox, supranote 9, at 34 ('[Wlomen financial professionals place greater

weight on downside or loss potential than men in an investment setting."); Niessen &
Ruenzi, supra note 9, at 2, 29 (summarizing study findings that (1) female mutual fund
managers are more risk averse and trade less than male investment managers, (2) there
is no significant difference in the performance of female-managed and male-managed
mutual funds, and (3) female-managed mutual funds perform more persistently than
male-managed funds); Garvert, supra note 9, at 28 (noting, based on the analysis of a
small sample set, that male-managed hedge funds exhibit higher risk and higher performance than female-managed hedge funds).
141. Atkinson et al., supranote 9, at 10, 13.
142. Id. at 10.
143. Id.; see also id. at 17 (attributing results indicating more significant gender-based

differences in earlier studies "to differences in expertise in financial decision making or
wealth constraints").
144. Niessen & Ruenzi, supranote 9, at 14 ("[Flemale fund managers are moderately
more risk averse than male fund managers.").
145. Id. at 15.

146. Id.
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fund managers trade less than male fund managers." 141 Moreover,
they find significant behavioral differences in mutual fund managers
based on their sex; 4 however, "[o]verall, where directly comparable,
the differences... are less pronounced than those reported in studies
149
investigating gender differences within the general population."'
2. Performance
Studies of the relative performance of portfolios managed by
female and male investment professionals are also inconclusive. Both
Atkinson et al. and Niessen and Ruenzi found that performance results of funds managed by women and men are similar. 5 ° Garvert,
however, in a small sample masters thesis, found that male-managed
hedge funds outperform female-managed hedge funds. 5 ' Garvert also
noted that the performance of female-managed funds is less variable,'52 a finding that Niessen and Ruenzi corroborate.5 3 Niessen
and Ruenzi also found that the performance
of female fund manager
4
portfolios is persistent over time.1,

III. SEX AND THE

REASONABLE INVESTOR

A comparison of the existing conceptions of the reasonable
investor with the attributes of actual female investors in the market
indicates that the reasonable investor is a woman - or, more accurately, the reasonable investor, as currently conceived, is more like
a woman than a man. This is especially true for individual female
investors. The exact attributes of professional female investors (other
than, perhaps, that they trade less frequently than male investment
professionals) are hard to pin down; the outcomes of the limited number of studies governing female investment advisors and managers
are mixed and, to the extent they are consistent with each other, the
observed effects are less significant than they are for individual
female investors.
Because individual female investors (and to a lesser extent, perhaps, female investment professionals) (1) seek more investment advice than male investors, (2) are less optimistic and less overconfident
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 17.
Id.
Id. at 3; see also id. at 17-18.
Atkinson et al., supra note 9, at 10-12; Niessen & Ruenzi, supra note 9, at 20.
Garvert, supranote 9, at 28-29.
Id. at 29.
Niessen & Ruenzi, supra note 9, at 21-23, 30.
Id. at 22-23, 30.
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than male investors, and (3) trade less frequently than male investors, they are closer than male investors to the rational, chartist/
fundamentalist, sophisticated (or at least informed) conceptualizations of the reasonable investor.
The notion of the reasonable investor - and the role of disclosure in implementing the investor protection and market integrity
policy underpinnings of federal securities laws - is dependent upon
investors informing themselves, 5 including (as women disproportionately do) through the use of investment advisory services. Informed investors of a certain level of sophistication (which women
using financial advisors are likely to have) are more likely to be able
to judge the actual importance of market information and accurately
gauge the total mix of available information. This means that they
are less likely to trade on the basis of mere puffery, ignore information comprising the "truth-on-the-market," and fail to take into
account meaningful, tailored cautionary language in market disclosures. These informed female investors also are unlikely to need the
protections of the 'least sophisticated investor" formulation proposed
by Professor Sachs." 6 They can fend for themselves, either alone or
with the assistance of their investment advisors, under the current
reasonable investor standard.
Women's lack of optimism in investing is more rational and more
aligned with the existing legal conception of the reasonable investor
than men's investment optimism. Because optimists may behave
irrationally by placing too much weight on positive information in
their investment decision making, they may be more vulnerable to
mere puffery, for example. Optimist investors may also inappropriately discount the significance of elements of the total mix of market
information or meaningful cautionary statements. The level of risk
that the optimist may then assume in his investment decision making is different from that of a speculator and is not necessarily associated with the reasonable investor under current law and lore. In
fact, the optimist investor looks more like Professor Huang's "moody
investor"5 7 than materiality's reasonable investor.
The fact that female investors exhibit less overconfidence in their
individual investment decision making also brings them closer to
the reasonable investor ideal than individual male investors (who
exhibit greater overconfidence in their investment decision making).
155. See, e.g., Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. GN Holdings, Inc., 67 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir.
1995) ("A reasonable investor is presumed to have information available in the public
domain ....
").
156. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
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Overconfident investors rely too heavily on their own perceived investment acumen in valuing securities and in making related trading
decisions; they are more likely to ignore the valuations and advice of
others. 5 ' Overconfident investors have been expressly contrasted
with rational investors,15 9 and rational investors have been likened
to the reasonable investor. Accordingly, overconfident investors are
less likely to be deemed reasonable investors and, because male investors typically are more overconfident than their female counterparts, the behavior of female investors is more likely than that of
male investors to conform to the existing reasonable investor model.
Overconfident investors trade more than others, which may be
irrational to the extent that excessive trading results in abnormally
low cost-adjusted returns. 16° Female investors (who are less overconfident than male investors) trade less frequently and with more consistent, persistent - and in some cases better - cost-adjusted returns.
Women's overall behavior in this regard appears to be more rational
than men's and, therefore, more consistent with existing conceptions
of the reasonable investor as a rational investor (unless, of course, the
lack of trading by women is attributable to other factors: an irrational
avoidance of risk, irrational pessimism or underconfidence, or an
irrationally low self-assessment of investment competence).''
The investment behavior of women, however, is not plainly consistent with the speculator model of the reasonable investor. Women
avoid risk in investment decision making more often than men.'6 2 This
may make female investors less able than male investors to fit into
the conceptualization of the reasonable investor as a speculator at least to the extent that women's risk avoidance is inconsistent with
being a "smart money" or "intelligent" speculator.'6 3 In particular,
women choose less risky portfolios than men when trading in equity
securities." This behavior, when linked to the more consistent and
158. Barber & Odean, supra note 9, at 263 ("(Overconfident investors] overestimate
the probability that their personal assessments of the security's value are more accurate
than the assessments of others. Thus, overconfident investors believe more strongly in
their own valuations, and concern themselves less about the beliefs of others.").
159. Id. ("Rational investors only trade and only purchase information when doing so
increases their expected utility. Overconfident investors, on the other hand, lower their
expected utility by trading too much ...." (citation omitted)); id. at 264 ("[llnvestors
trade too much and to their detriment. The findings are inconsistent with rationality and
not easily explained in the absence of overconfidence.").
160. Id. at 264.
161. Interestingly, in this regard, one study found that "females are not willing to make
risky investments even when downside risk is artificially limited." Felton et al., supra
note 9, at 39.
162. Id. at 33.
163. See supra note 27.
164. Barber & Odean, supranote 9, at 263-64 ('Overconfident investors also hold riskier
portfolios than do rational investors with the same degree of risk aversion.").
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persistent (but not always better) results associated with women's
investment portfolios, seems inconsistent with the high-risk, highreward nature of speculation. Portfolios managed by men (bigger risktakers) may do better or worse than those managed by women; their
investment performance is significantly more varied" and more consistent with the speculator conception of the reasonable investor.
IV. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE REASONABLE INVESTOR?
The analysis in Part III shows that, based on existing research,
the investment behavior of women conforms more closely to existing
conceptions of the reasonable investor than the investment behavior
of men. Especially when viewed in the context of the consistent, persistent, and (sometimes) better investment results achieved by female
investors, this finding may indicate that little or no alteration of the
reasonable investor conception is required in order to protect female
investors in the public securities markets.
Female investors, however, do not conform perfectly to existing
conceptions of the reasonable investor. To the extent that female
investors are not idealized embodiments of the reasonable investor
(because, for example, they may not conform well to the speculator
model), their interests may not be adequately protected. Although
unlikely, a prototypical female investor might find certain misstated
or omitted information important or significant to the total mix of
available information, while the speculator would not, leaving the
prototypical female investor without a cause of action for securities
fraud. Under these circumstances the existing conception of the reasonable investor would not serve women effectively, and those who
want to afford more comprehensive protection to women would need
to seek an adjustment to that conception.
The conclusion that legal change is necessary to better protect
women (or, for that matter, men), however, relies on certain important
assumptions. Principal among them are assumptions that (1) market
behaviors should impact the nature of the reasonable investor (or
any alternative conception), as defined and used under Rule 10b-5
(and potentially elsewhere in the federal securities laws), and (2) we
intend and desire to protect with Rule 10b-5 (and other antifraud
provisions) an investor who behaves like the prototypical female (or
165. See Felton et al., supra note 9, at 38-39 ('Risky investments sometimes pay off.
This was demonstrated in the greater variability in portfolio value for men than women.
Although optimism was not significantly related to portfolio variability in the current
research, the volatile nature of riskier investments would likely lead optimistic men to
experience greater fluctuations in their portfolio value over the long run.").
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male) investor described in Part II. The remainder of this part
examines these assumptions in greater detail.
A. Market Behavior and the ReasonableInvestor
"[I]t has been argued that where a security is traded in an
efficient market, the market itself should serve as the reasonable
investor."166 But nowhere does it expressly state that the reasonable
investor is intended to serve as a proxy for the average (or any other)
actual investor. In fact, there is an argument, and some sentiment, for
keeping the objective notion of the reasonable investor an idealized,
normative standard (as it arguably is now). 67 Among other things, an
idealized, normative standard may be used to help channel investor
behavior toward that norm.' "Here, we run into the ever-troublesome
distinction between the normative and the descriptive."1 69
Scholars often theorize as if the market were an incubator or
proving ground for accepted and acceptable conceptions of the reasonable investor. These scholars focus on the descriptive, but frequently
not to the complete exclusion of the normative. 70 Their suggestions
for modification of the reasonable investor notion emanate from compelling market realities.
For example, Professor Sachs observes that "[slocial change has
long driven change in securities law."17 ' Consistent with this observation, and "due to the pervasiveness of Internet fraud, telemarketing
fraud, and the ready availability of 'mooch lists' of the unsophisticated, elderly, or otherwise vulnerable,"7 2 she suggests a need to protect "unsophisticated investors trading in inefficient markets" with
her 'least sophisticated investor" standard. 7 3 Interestingly, Professor
Sachs notes that some courts have already reacted to protect these
166. Padfield, supranote 13, at 346.
167. See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 542 & n.24 (citing Huang, supra note 7, at 111
(indicating many courts' view of the reasonable investor as "idealized," rather than "a
descriptive realistic depiction of actual behavior")); Padfield, supra note 13, at 347-48
(same).
168. See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 594 ('The shift in the rationale for findings of presumed immateriality over time from standards to bright-line rules suggests that materiality is evolving toward a formal choice: investors must behave in a certain way or suffer
the consequences."). But see Huang, supra note 7, at 111 ('Courts have not eliminated and
will not even necessarily reduce moody investing simply by holding that moody investing
behavior is not reasonable, especially if moody investing is prevalent and unconscious.").
169. Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A
BehavioralApproach to SecuritiesRegulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 135, 184 (2002).
170. See, e.g., Huang, supranote 7, at 111.
171. Sachs, supranote 1, at 474.
172. Id. at 476-77 (footnotes omitted).
173. Id. at 476, 481.
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"underclass investors" by stretching the existing conception of the
reasonable investor to fit the facts of emergent cases and achieve the
desired results,
posing danger to the existing reasonable investor
4
standard.11
Similarly, Professor Huang offers that "[t]he level and nature
of securities litigation and enforcement do and should depend on the
7 5 He argues that affect, as
level and nature of securities investing.""
well as cognition, is (or should be deemed) reasonable in investment
decision making and that the applicable legal conception of the reasonable investor ought to reflect that market reality.' 6
Moody investing suggests a new definition for the reasonableness of investors which does not privilege cognition over affect,
but instead acknowledges the reasonableness of some moods in
certain situations. Such a reformulation of reasonableness implies
that drawing a hard and fast line between cognition and emotion
is artificial, if not impossible. In other words, determinations of
reasonableness would and should depend not just on the cognitive
nature and quality of information processing, but also upon
177 the
affective nature and quality of information processing.
Both of these scholars identify market activity that is outside
the scope of the current reasonable investor paradigm and suggest
ways of altering the reasonable investor conception (and, in essence,
materiality) to fill the perceived gap. Although one might (and should)
78
question the need to react to market forces with legal change,'
there are at least two good reasons why the notion of the reasonable
investor should be expressly responsive to selected market changes.
First, if the reasonable investor standard does not explicitly react
to market change, courts that want to provide protection to certain
plaintiffs may informally stretch the bounds of the existing standard
beyond recognition, creating legal uncertainty. 17 Professor Sachs
174. Id. at 479-80.
175. Huang, supra note 7, at 100.
176. Id. at 112.
177. Id.
178. See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56
STAN. L. REv. 1, 56 (2003) (contending "that regulators seeking to supplant the market
in order to correct behavioral biases should bear the burden of overcoming a strong presumption against regulation"); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Mandatory Disclosure and the Protectionof Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669, 693-95 (1984)
(arguing that securities regulation should not particularly protect unsophisticated or
uninformed investors).
179. See Sachs, supra note 1, at 479. The competence of courts to engage inthis kind
of norm setting is questionable. See Padfield, supra note 13, at 348 ([I]t
is highly questionable whether courts should be the ones deciding upon the norms - particularly without
any express acknowledgement thereof.").
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critiques the phenomenon by reference to courts' materiality assessments under the current standard, which she refers to as "Northway/
Basic."18 0 Reported securities fraud decisions in cases brought by the
SEC and the Department of Justice on behalf of "underclass investors"
("unsophisticated investors trading in inefficient markets without
an adviser"), which she terms "underclass decisions,"181
deal a body blow to materiality as it is currently understood.
While characterizing the fraud as "fantastic," "clearly... not
true," "patently impossible," "phantasmagorical," "inconceivable
on its face," "beyond belief," or "incredible," these decisions nevertheless hold that the fraud satisfies Northway/Basic.In the process, they undermine the notion of "the reasonable investor" and
thereby jeopardize Northway/Basic'sstability and its important
contributions to federal securities fraud enforcement in other

contexts. 182
Second, an inflexible standard - one that is not reactive to
market changes - affords those intent on perpetrating fraud with
a clear path to do wrong without fear of retribution.1 8 3 Of course,
another cause of action may be available to punish the purposeful
wrongdoer in the absence of a viable Rule 10b-5 (or other securities
fraud) claim. But the variety of securities fraud actions (public and
private), the stigma associated with a potential securities fraud conviction or liability, and the varied, stringent remedies available to
securities fraud plaintiffs (among other substantive and procedural
advantages applicable in individual cases) may make securities fraud
(and especially Rule 10b-5) actions desirable avenues of relief."s
180. Sachs, supra note 1, at 476.
181. Id. at 476, 478.
182. Id. at 479 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
183. See Langevoort, supranote 169, at 185 (noting, with respect to potential expansions of the reasonable investor concept, that "a hands-off legal approach would only
invite a high incidence of exploitation").
184. See, e.g., James D. Gordon III, Acorns and Oaks: Implied Rights of Action Under
the Securities Acts, 10 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 62, 85 (2004) ('Because Rule 10b-5 actions
are so much more attractive, they overshadow the express private remedy in section 18
[of the 1934 Act]."); Robert A. Prentice & Mark E. Roszkowski, The Sale of Business
Doctrine:New Relief from Securities Regulationor a New Haven for Welshers?, 44 OHIO
ST. L.J. 473, 511 n.250 (1983) (setting forth various substantive and procedural advantages of Rule 10b-5 claims over state law fraud claims); Brendan J. McCarthy, Note, '7n
Connection With'" The Need for Limitation to SEC Rule 10b-5 in Dissemination of
MisleadingInformationCases, 54 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1347, 1347 (2004) (discussing the
impact on corporate performance from the stigma of securities fraud allegations); Daniela
Nanau, Note, Analyzing Post-Market Boom Jurisprudence in the Second and Ninth
Circuits: Has the Pendulum Really Swung Too Farin Favor of Plaintiffs?, 3 CARDOZO
PUB. L. POLY & ETHIcs J. 943, 951 (2006) (The implied right of action pursuant to § 10(b)
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It would be improvident for the law to react to every observed
market anomaly not included in the existing conceptions of the reasonable investor. Accordingly, if the law is to incorporate marketreactive conceptions of the reasonable investor, it will be important
to determine how to choose the market variances that should be incorporated into the reasonable investor standard. For example, if
the market behaviors of underclass investors, moody investors, moral
investors, female investors, or any other subset of the investor population are considered reasonable investor behaviors (or if the reasonable investor notion is recast for use in a specific context, as Professor
Sachs suggests), then a policy-oriented and doctrinal justification
must be given for each.
Several scholars have suggested, expressly or impliedly, that
the reasonable investor and materiality as a whole should reflect
"common" market behaviors.' 8 5 There is some attraction to this suggestion, in that the notion of the reasonable investor would reflect
the perspective of the general, ordinary, run-of-the-mill investor. But
why, based on policy and doctrine, should commonality be the test,
and how do we define commonality? Professor Donald Langevoort
suggests "keep[ing] the definition materially tied to what is commonplace or normal, whether we admire the behavior or not." " He makes
a persuasive case by anchoring his proposal to the maintenance of
market integrity, stating that this expanded, flexible materiality stanof market price
dard is necessary for achievement of "some18semblance
7
markets)."
unmanipulated
(i.e.,
integrity
Assuming we can identify, at any given time, what is "commonplace" or "normal" in investing, is the common investor always the
type of investor we should protect through the reasonable investor
concept and the materiality standard? Assuming their behaviors are
commonplace or normal, do we want to protect (and thereby encourage) behaviors exhibited by underclass investors, moody investors,
moral investors, or female investors by terming their behaviors
"reasonable" or by otherwise altering the materiality standard to
reflect their behaviors? How do we decide who to protect?

and Rule 10b-5... continues to be a favored claim, because it can be applied to a wide
variety of factual contexts. Federal courts have recognized a range of claims filed pursuant to the implied right of action, from problems regarding corporate misstatements
or non-disclosures, to malfeasance that arises in the context of transactions in shares
and other securities." (footnotes omitted)).
185. See Huang, supra note 7, at 112; Langevoort, supra note 169, at 186; Padfield,
supra note 13, at 348.
186. Langevoort, supra note 169, at 186.
187. Id.
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B. Investor Protectionand the ReasonableInvestor
Not every investor is protected under the federal securities laws.
As one court notes, "[t]he market has risks; the securities laws do not
serve as investment insurance. Every prediction of success that fails
to materialize cannot create on that account an action for securities
fraud." 8 ' The question of who should be protected by the reasonable
investor standard can best be answered by reference to both the policies underlying the federal securities laws and the doctrine used to
effectuate those policies.
Federal securities regulation-including Rule 1Ob-5 as adopted
by the SEC under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act - aims to protect investors and maintain the integrity of the securities markets.8 9 Mandatory disclosure and fraud protection (including under Rule 10b-5)
effectuate these objectives."9 Overall, disclosure is the key implementation vehicle.'91
Conceptions of the reasonable investor and of materiality are
rooted in disclosure. As noted earlier, assuming the existence of a
duty to disclose, materiality sorts out that which must be disclosed
from that which need not be disclosed; the sorting mechanism relies
on a determination of the importance of the relevant facts to the reasonable investor or the reasonable investor's view on the significance
of the relevant facts to the total mix of available information. 192
188. Raab v. Gen. Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 291 (4th Cir. 1993); see also DiLeo v.
Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Securities laws do not guarantee
sound business practices and do not protect investors against reverses.").
189. Tamar Frankel, The Internet, SecuritiesRegulation, and Theory of Law, 73 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1319, 1325 n.17, 1334, 1341 (1998); see also Hazen, supra note 28, at 1037
(concluding that, in securities regulation, "good regulatory policy should balance the goal
of market efficiency against the goals of market integrity and investor protection");
Donna M. Nagy, Refraining the MisappropriationTheory of Insider Trading Liability:
A Post-O'Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1228 (1998) (noting "the investor
protection and market integrity policy objectives underlying the federal securities laws';
Jennifer O'Hare, Preemption Under the Securities Litigation Uniform StandardsAct: If
It Looks Like a Securities FraudClaim and Acts Like a Securities FraudClaim, Is It a
Securities FraudClaim?, 56 ALA. L. REV. 325, 376 (2004) (stating that "investor protection
and market integrity" are the policies underlying Rule lOb-5).
190. See Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitabilityof a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV.
775, 803 (2006) ("After the Great Crash of 1929, Congress attempted to restore investor
confidence in the nation's markets. Its two primary tools, embodied in the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, were mandatory disclosure and punishment for fraudulent disclosures. Thus, two very simple heuristics emerged: Disclosure
is good and fraud is bad." (footnotes omitted)).
191. See How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, http://www.sec
.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Jan. 11, 2009).
192. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider
Trading: A Call for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1148-50 (2003); supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
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When we note commonplace or normal market behaviors that
are not incorporated into existing conceptions of the reasonable investor, we may be observing a number of different things in relation
to policy and doctrine. One possibility is that existing doctrine is entirely appropriate as is: that we intend to exclude these behaviors,
and therefore causes of action brought by or on behalf of investors
exhibiting them, from coverage under Rule 10b-5. In this case, we are
making a decision that the investor protection and market integrity
maintenance policies underlying Rule 10b-5 are not served by protecting investors who exhibit these behaviors. This decision may be
based on an assessment that protecting these investors would require
unacceptable reductions in the protections afforded to other investors
or have negative effects on market integrity.
Another possibility is that the current reasonable investor concept is underinclusive in certain key respects, as posited by Professors
Huang, Langevoort, Sachs, and others with respect to particular
market behaviors. In other words, it is possible that the notion of the
reasonable investor in materiality doctrine would better promote investor protection and market integrity maintenance if it were expanded or altered for use in specific situations to incorporate certain
additional market behaviors.'9 3 Protection of the class of investors exhibiting these behaviors may not negatively impact existing investor
protections and may enhance the integrity of the market. Under this
scenario, where a change in doctrine clearly serves applicable policy,
absent significant offsetting costs requiring a compromise in the promotion of policy objectives (e.g., excessive litigation or promotion of
undesirable investor or market behaviors), an expansion or alteration
of the reasonable investor concept should be undertaken.'9 4
It is also possible, however, that the absence of certain enhanced conceptions of the reasonable investor in current doctrine
signals a more fundamental failure that requires a different kind of
action. For example, it is possible that we are observing the failure
or inadequacy of disclosure as an implementation vehicle for the
193. See Huang, supranote 7, at 111-12; Langevoort, supranote 169, at 185-86; Sachs,

supra note 1, at 481.
194. Scholars suggesting this approach either assume or call into question the historical role of courts in defining materiality and reasonable investor status. See Huang,

supranote 7, at 111 (questioning court implementation); Langevoort, supranote 169, at
186 (assuming court implementation); Padfield, supra note 13, at 348 (questioning court
implementation); Sachs, supra note 1, at 481, 502 (assuming court implementation).
Optimally, a comparative institutional analysis should be done to select the most effective body to implement any formal rule proposal. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock,
Paper,Scissors: Choosingthe Right Vehicle for FederalCorporateGovernanceInitiatives,

10 FoRDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 225, 228 (2005) (suggesting a framework for comparative
institutional analysis for the implementation of federal corporate governance initiatives).
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investor protection and market integrity maintenance policies underlying Rule 10b-5 and U.S. securities regulation as a whole. According to Professor Sachs, underclass investors lack the knowledge and
sophistication (or advice as a substitute) sufficient to enable them
195
to properly use disclosures in a way that guides their investments.
Professor Huang asserts that moody investors interpret disclosure
signals differently than others. 196 Professor Langevoort asserts, in
discussing investor interpretations and use of disclosure commonly
identified as mere puffery,' that behavioral analysis has identified
certain heuristics routinely used by investors that cause them to
trade in a manner that deviates from the expected sophisticated
investor model."9 '
According to the research presented in Part II, women and men
respond differently to the same disclosures. In each case, assuming
compliance with applicable mandatory disclosure rules and market
disclosures consistent with normative notions of fraud protection, disclosure is not influencing the actions of significant numbers of real
investors in the marketplace in the same way. It is possible that we
need something more than disclosure to effectuate the policies underlying Rule 10b-5 and the federal securities laws. Among other things,
we may need or want to change investor behavior (rather than, or in
addition to, changing the behavior of the issuer or other disclosing
person or entity).
Disclosure may not be the only appropriate vehicle to encourage
investor behavior. 9 ' If investors behave differently when afforded
195. See Sachs, supra note 1, at 503-04 (describing the least sophisticated investor).
196. See, e.g., Huang, supra note 7, at 118 ("So-called mere puffery may nonetheless
be material because of the positive, strong moods that it evokes. Forward-looking statements that do not rise to the level of a virtual guarantee may nonetheless instill and infuse
their listeners with euphoric moods that are not sensitive to probability variations.").
197. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
198. See Langevoort, supranote 169, at 185 ("If managerial hype succeeds in gaining
media attention, it will draw a higher level of investor attention to the company and its
past success, prompting the kinds of heuristic reasoning that causes investors to buy the
company stock.").
199. Professor Susanna Kim Ripken raises this concern directly in a recent law review
article.
In light of the recent corporate scandals and the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it is important to ask whether our time-honored belief
in the power of disclosure is really merited. Our system of disclosure has
serious weaknesses that cannot be ignored. In order for a disclosure system
to be effective, not only must the information that is supplied be disclosed
completely, clearly, and accurately, but it must also be read and comprehended by the consumer. Here is where disclosure today fails in its purpose.
The emphasis in securities law on providing information to the public is premised on the belief that individuals are rational, self-governing actors who
are willing and able to process the information wisely. If we assume that
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access to the same disclosure, and the law would protect one investor
more than the other, but (as a policy matter) we do not want to protect one more than the other, then we may need to introduce other
elements into law or regulation or encourage extralegal means of
better matching investor behavior to the legally protected class of
reasonable investors. Depending on the reason for disclosure's failure
or inadequacy in a particular circumstance, there may be different
enhancements that could work. For example, barriers to knowledge
and understanding (even barriers created by cognitive biases) may
be overcome with targeted investor education. 0 0
investors are rational risk calculators who are consistently capable of weighing the costs and benefits of risky alternatives and selecting the best option,
then a system of disclosure makes good sense. However, substantial evidence
indicates that such assumptions of rationality and efficiency in information
processing are faulty. Cognitive biases and decision-making constraints
cause individuals to depart systematically from rational choice models of
decision-making. Moreover, disclosure that is too long or complex to be comprehensible to the average person floods the individual with too much nonessential data and overloads the person with information that inhibits optimal
decision-making. Securities regulation is motivated by the assumption that
more information is better than less, but evidence shows that too much disclosure can ultimately be counterproductive to the decision-making processes
of the individual investor.
Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangersand Drawbacks of the DisclosureAntidote: Toward
a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 146-47
(2006) (footnotes omitted); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure
Paradigmin a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 36 ("The complexity of structured transactions undermines the long-held disclosure paradigm ...").
200. See generally Stephen Choi, RegulatingInvestors Not Issuers: A Market-Based
Proposal,88 CAL. L. REV. 279, 311 (2000) (suggesting that "[riegulators and private parties
could also use [an investor] licensing process to educate investors"); Choi & Pritchard,
supra note 178, at 66 ("Education can also influence investors' decisions."); Lawrence A.
Cunningham, BehavioralFinanceand Investor Governance,59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767,
788-96 (2002) (suggesting ways that investor education might address behavioral biases);
James A. Fanto, We're All CapitalistsNow: The Importance, Nature, Provision and
Regulation ofInvestor Education,49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 105, 126-55 (1998) (advocating
a multilayered approach to investor education in three key areas: saving, investing, and
financial fraud); E. Richie Reyes, Current Public Law and Policy Issues, Can America
Escape the Cloud of Corporate Corruption With the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002? A
Proposal to Restore Efficiency and Integrity into the Capital Markets by Mandating
CorporateDisclosures of Real-Time Information and Encouraging Investor Education,
24 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POLY 147, 176-83 (2002) (promoting a new public policy emphasizing investor education so that investors will be able to make effective use of the "realtime information" disclosures mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). Professor
Janis Sarra notes that
[i]nvestor education ...can enhance investor knowledge and provide skills
to assess disclosures. While education does not remedy an individual's
capacity to digest and apply information, it can serve to reduce disparities
in processing information and reduce the incidence of completely uninformed
decision making. Education can provide investors with a greater appreciation
of their own limits (time, resources and information) with respect to investment decisions without the assistance of knowledgeable advisors.
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However, efforts at investor education also are subject to criticism. In particular, some commentators claim that these efforts are
ineffectual.2" 1 The possession of information by an investor does not
imply its use in investment decision making. Certainly, investor
education alone is not likely to provide the desired level of protection for every investment context in which protection is desired.0 2
Moreover, investor education adds cost to the regulatory framework
that should be assessed in relation to its perceived benefits and other
possible responses.
Other alternatives or supplements to disclosure regulation involve
the substantive regulation of issuers or investors and enhancements
in fraud protection, protection against deception and manipulation
that does not rely solely on the accurate and complete public disclosure of available material information. A number of proposals have
been forwarded along these lines. The principal regulatory suggestions are categorized and described in the next few paragraphs.
Professor Susanna Kim Ripken (among others) suggests greater
substantive regulation of corporate (including director and executive)
behavior as a supplement to disclosure regulation.2 3 The possibilities
for substantive regulation to prevent fraud are seemingly endless.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley") takes a step in
that direction in its prohibition on corporate loans to directors and
executives.2 4
Professor Stephen Choi, on the other hand, suggests that we
regulate investors by licensing them to make certain types of investments based on their knowledge of "the range of market participants,
the possible risks they pose to investors, and available investor protection devices."20 Aden R. Pavkov echoes Professor Choi's proposal
when he suggests that "regulation could be directed towards the investors, classifying them into baskets of investing sophistication (as
Janis Sarra, Disclosureas a PublicPolicy Instrument in Global CapitalMarkets, 42 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 875, 883 (2007).

201. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 178, at 66-68 (setting forth this and other drawbacks
of investor education as a solution to the inadequacies of disclosure regulation); Henry
T. C. Hu, Illiteracy and Intervention: Wholesale Derivatives, Retail Mutual Funds, and
the Matter of Asset Class, 84 GEo. L.J. 2319, 2372 (1996) (noting that "there are limits
to the efficacy of education" in the investment context and that "initial efforts at this kind
of public education have been quite disappointing").
202. See Fanto, supra note 200, at 135 n.108.
203. Ripken, supra note 199, at 190-95; see also Aden R. Pavkov, Ghouls and Godsends?
A Critique of'Reverse Merger"Policy,3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 475, 490-91 (2006); Schwarcz,
supra note 199, at 29-36.
204. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (2006) (codifying section 402 of Sarbanes-Oxley).
205. Choi, supranote 200, at 333-34.
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determined by knowledge, wealth, or experience) and then permitting
investments only in securities of appropriate complexity and risk."2
A companion idea would be to have investors act through sophisticated market agents.0 7 SEC rules regulating private placement transactions under Regulation D2 °. work off these premises.2" 9
It also is possible for the U.S. government to engage in more
aggressive regulation of the behaviors and practices of other market
participants (including securities analysts, brokers, and rating agencies) and corporate advisors and agents (lawyers, investment banks,
and accountants). 20 Recent initiatives, including Sarbanes-Oxley's
increased regulation of accountants and lawyers, exemplify this type
of directive. 211 Gatekeeper regulation is an expanding part of securities regulation.
In addition, as a supplement to disclosure regulation, the SEC
could increase its efforts to monitor mandatory and voluntary disclosures or its related enforcement activities (i.e., the government
could throw human capital and other resources at the perceived problem).212 Sarbanes-Oxley increased the SEC's disclosure oversight
function," 3 and the SEC has pursued more enforcement actions in
206. Pavkov, supranote 203, at 491.
207. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 178, at 57.
208. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-508 (2008) (noting especially sections 230.501(a), 230.501(e)
and 230.506(b)(2) regarding the treatment of accredited and sophisticated investors).
209. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 178, at 57; Erik F. Gerding, Laws Against
Bubbles: An Experimental-Asset-MarketApproach to Analyzing FinancialRegulation,
2007 Wis. L. REv. 977, 1009; Pavkov, supra note 203, at 491.
210. See Prentice, supranote 190, at 785-97.
211. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal CorporateLaw: Lessons
from History, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1793, 1819-21 (2006) (describing ways in which federal
law regulates corporate advisors and other gatekeepers); Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard
and the InitialPublic Offering, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 711, 779-82 (2005) (describing recent
regulation of investment analysts and investment banks); Arthur R. Pinto, Control and
Responsibility of Credit Rating Agencies in the United States, 54 AM. J. CoMP. L.
(SUPPLEMENT) 341, 348-51 (2006) (describing Sarbanes-Oxley's connection with recent
proposed and actual rating agency regulation); Mark J. Roe, Delaware'sCompetition, 117
HARV. L. REV. 588, 623 (2003) (noting and briefly describing Sarbanes-Oxley's regulation
of lawyers and accountants); William H. Volz & Vahe Tazian, The Role of Attorneys Under
Sarbanes-Oxley: The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee as Facilitatorof Corporate
Integrity,43 AM. Bus. L.J. 439,439 (2006) ("With the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress
and the SEC .... expand accountability of corporate gatekeepers, such as accountants,
attorneys, and financial analysts.").
212. See, e.g., Pavkov, supra note 203, at 495.
213. See 15 U.S.C. § 7266 (2006) (codifying section 104(b)(1)(B) of Sarbanes-Oxley);
Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform
(And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REv. 915, 968 (2003) ('Putting more pressure on
the watchdog function of the SEC, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the SEC to review
disclosures, including financial statements, regularly and systematically, giving every
company a once-over triennially.").
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recent years.2 14 In short, the SEC already appears to be active in
pursuing these alternatives.
Finally, the U.S. government also could guarantee or certify the
quality of investments as a companion to disclosure and other securities regulation or designate or permit a third party to do so in
a regulated environment.21 5 Although this approach has apparent
advantages, it also has significant drawbacks. For one thing, the expertise of the government in quality certification is questionable at
best.2" 6 Moreover, merit regulation of securities markets is widely disfavored as ineffectual or inefficient.21 7
Of course, proposals of the kinds described above (as alternatives
or supplements to disclosure regulation) have the capacity to be significantly more paternalistic than disclosure regulation, and their
implementation would take us further away from a privately ordered,
free-market system of securities trading. In addition, as most observers readily point out, a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis may
reveal that none of these nondisclosure regulatory proposals is more
effective or efficient than maintaining the status quo or engaging in
further disclosure regulation. And (finally) some of the suggested
substantive regulatory initiatives may not be practical or politically
feasible.218
Yet, each and all of these (and other) alternatives to further disclosure regulation should be considered as a response to regulatory
failures. Any attempt to change investor behavior in response to disclosure, however, should be designed to address the underlying reason
why the behavior fails to conform to expected, normative behavior our market measure.2" 9 Accordingly, if we want women to take more
calculated investment risks, then we need to know more about what
214. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, ReassessingDamages in SecuritiesFraud Class
Actions, 66 MD. L. REV. 348, 395 (2007) ("[A]s compared with the average from 2000 to
2002, the 2005 statistics indicate that SEC enforcement actions increased...."); Thomas
C. Pearson & Gideon Mark, Investigations, Inspections, and Audits in the Post-SOX
Environment, 86 NEB. L. REV. 43, 78 (2007) ("SEC enforcement actions increased after
SOX, partly because SEC funding increased in the aftermath of the legislation." (footnote
omitted)); Hillary A. Sale, Banks: The Forgotten(?)Partnersin Fraud,73 U. CIN. L. REV.
139, 176 (2004) ("[Bloth the number of SEC enforcement actions and the size of its settlements are increasing.").
215. See Schwarcz, supranote 199, at 26-29.
216. Id. at 27.
217. See, e.g., Choi & Pritchard, supranote 178, at 56-57.
218. See Langevoort, supra note 169, at 173 n.161 (making a comment in this regard
with respect to Professor Choi's proposal, discussed supra note 201 and accompanying

text).
219. Accord Choi & Pritchard, supranote 178, at 59 ("Absent the ability to distinguish
among investors, crafting regulatory responses to behavioral biases becomes a guessing
game.!).
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causes women to refrain from risky investment decisions. Or, if we
want men to be less overconfident in their investment behavior, then
we need to determine what makes men overconfident in that environment. Changes to the reasonable investor paradigm and disclosure
regulation more generally are only one way to approach the issue of
investor protection.
This brings us back to the observed differences between female
and male investors. Does the law mean to protect women and men
differently, and is a woman more like the type of investor that the
law intends to protect? Although economic theory may indicate that
the more informed, rational behavior of women (leaving aside their
risk-aversion and loss-avoidance attributes) is more worthy of protection (at least in a market ruled by the ECMH), there is no apparent policy-based reason why securities fraud doctrine should better
protect women than men, or men than women. Neither investor protection nor market integrity maintenance demand that female and
male investors receive different treatment in the event of alleged or
actual absent or faulty disclosure.
In fact, both policy objectives may be harmed by a reasonable investor construct that protects women and men differently. Certainly,
both women and men are commonplace or normal investors in the
current market, as are the behavioral attributes that distinguish
them as investors: engagement with investment advice, risk tolerance, optimism, overconfidence, and frequency of trading. Differential
treatment may leave female or male investors without a remedy in
circumstances where a disclosing person or entity intends to deceive
and takes advantage of a particular known investor attribute. At
some level, market awareness of disparate treatment will create disruptions that may threaten market integrity. As yet, there is no
apparent cause for alarm in this regard. Although women may be
better protected than men under current conceptions of the reasonable investor standard, neither women nor men are asserting that
current securities fraud prohibitions actually fail to protect them
adequately because of attributes related to their sex or gender. In
fact, wider dissemination of the investor attributes described in Part
II of this article, as well as the analysis of these attributes under
important and relevant legal and regulatory rules (in this article
and elsewhere), may be enough to alert investors to their relative
strengths and weaknesses and help mitigate any significant, actual
disparities in investor protection based on sex or gender. To the extent that policy determines the need to better protect female, male,
or any other segregable subgroup of investors, however, significant
research should be done to identify the root causes of the relevant
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investor behaviors. In addition, consideration should be given to both
(1) expanding materiality through a reconceptualization of the reasonable investor paradigm (and, potentially, reformulating the related
scienter or reliance elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim) and (2) revising
laws, regulations, or related practices as a means of changing investor behavior.
CONCLUSION

This article extends scholarship that questions the existing
materiality standard used under Rule 10b-5 (and elsewhere in
U.S. securities regulation) and its touchstone notion of the reasonable investor. Specifically, the article asks and answers a seemingly
straightforward, yet provocative, question: Is the reasonable investor a woman? The article then preliminarily explores the potential
significance of its key findings: women and men exhibit different
investment behaviors and achieve different investment outcomes;
and the resulting female investor profile is closer to existing conceptions of the reasonable investor than the resulting male investor
profile.
In the process, this article contributes to extant literature on
the reasonable investor in a number of ways.
It collects and describes existing actual and theoretical
conceptions of the reasonable investor.
It uses empirical studies from the social sciences to
identify attributes of real investors in the market.
It assesses the attributes of real investors in terms of
prevailing reasonable investor conceptions.
It proposes a means for identifying those investors who
need the protection of Rule 10b-5 and the federal securities laws by reference to applicable policy and doctrine.
As a further contribution, the article suggests that market-responsive
adjustments to the reasonable investor standard may not be the only
way to affect change that serves to better protect investors and assure
the continued integrity of the securities markets, particularly where
disclosure regulation provides inadequate protection (because disclosures are misunderstood, misinterpreted, or disregarded).
As women become bigger players in the securities markets, it
may be comforting to know that they are relatively well protected by
existing conceptions of the reasonable investor. The knowledge that
women are not completely protected by these existing conceptions
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and that men are less well protected than women under the current
reasonable investor paradigm, however, gives us pause and forces
us to reconsider inaction. To that end, this article continues an ongoing academic and practical conversation about when changes in
investor protection should be undertaken and how changes in investor protection are best made - not just for the benefit of women
or men, but for the benefit of all underprotected investors.

